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At face value, foreign aid is generally extended either to contain crises
situations or promote development. In Africa, it appears that foreign aid has
failed on both counts. One crucial question being asked by experts is, why
has there been so little development in sub-Saharan Africa despite so much
aid? Indeed, even the World Bank has admitted grudgingly that assistance
programs have been either ineffectual or had very small development impact
on recipient countries. This study seeks to examine foreign aid effectiveness
and management. Focusing on the nature of the relationships between donors
and recipients, the study argues that to foster economic development in Africa,
a need exists for a transformation in aid relations away from fragmented
donor-driven projects and programs to a predictable long-term support to
African owned programs.
The work addresses these challenges by reviewing current debates and
analysis of new forms, instruments, promises, and direction of development
cooperation. Donor discourses, which are on ownership, partnership, less
conditionalities, and more empowerment, are not always followed in practice.
In fact, the objective reality is that foreign aid donors usually target an
assortment of aid instruments at diverse objectives. That notwithstanding,
foreign aid (generally) can only be effective in achieving the objectives set by
donors when it is planned, structured, and implemented in partnership with aid
recipients. Clearly, the nature of the relationships between donors and
recipients has a critical influence on the effectiveness of development aid. So
far, the current aid experience is that the relationship between African
governments and their aid donors is characterized by a vast inequality.
As such, this study takes the position that there is no viable alternative to
Africans taking effective charge of their destiny and deliberately creating
conditions that are essential for effecting desirable change in the region's
fortunes. It also takes the position that Africa's development partners such as
the international financial institutions should actively seek to create and nurture
the space needed by Africans for the realization of their developmental goals.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express my appreciation and thanks to Dr. N. I. Okeke Uzodike
for his critical comments on earlier drafts of this work, and for his subsequent
valuable suggestions and guidance at every stage of this work. Indeed, the
completion of this study would be a mirage with out his assistance. Also, I
would like to express my profound gratitude to the University of Natal and the
Faculty of Human and Management Sciences for the Graduate Assistance
awarded to me, which in no small way has assisted me in carrying out this
study.
Eunice Okeke deserves a special mention for her continuous support and
encouragement. I also wish to thank my friends, particularly Kwasi Yobo,
Chinedu Chukwujekwu, and Olubukola Akintola for their encouragement.
Finally, I wish to thank my family (particularly my mother, sisters, and brothers)
for their tremendous patience and understanding over the past year and half.
My greatest debt is to my wife, Meg. I could not have finished this work
without her forbearance, support and, most importantly, her belief in me.
DEDICATION: This work is dedicated to my wife Meg Nwakaego with love.
11
DECLARATION
Except where explicitly indicated to the contrary, this study is the original work










































Center for Economic and Policy Research




















Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries










(Mozambique) National Union of Cashew Workers
Sub-Saharan Africa
United Nations Development Programme








TABLE OF CONTENTS VI
LIST OF TABLES IX
LIST OF FIGURES IX
CHAPTER ONE 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.2 Research Methodology 5
1.3 Realist-Idealist Arguments on Foreign Aid 6
1.3.1 The Realist Argument 6
1.3.2 The Idealist Argument 8
CHAPTER TWO 11
LITERATURE REViEW 11
2.1 Historical Background of Foreign Aid 11
2.2 Theories of Foreign Aid 12
2.3 Perspectives on the Rationale for Foreign Aid 19
2.3.1 Moral Argument for Aid 19
2.3.2 Economic Argument for Aid 21
2.4 Donor Interests: Scholarly Perspectives 22
2.5 FOREIGN AID: ITS SOURCES, NATURE AND IMPACT IN AFRICA .. 28
2.5.1 Introduction 28
VI.
2.5.2 The Nature and Limited Efficiency of Foreign Aid Allocations .. 30
2.5.2.1 Bilateral Aid 32
2.5.2.2 Multilateral Aid 34
2.5.3 Foreign Aid: The General Assembly Target 35
2.5.4 Decline of Aid Flows 39
2.5.5 Donor-Recipient Aid Relationships 41
2.5.6 Conclusion 45
CHAPTER THREE 47
AFRICA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 47
3.1 Introduction 47
3.2 Africa's Experience of Development.. 49
3.3 Development Strategies in Africa 51
3.4 Development Challenges in Africa 57
CHAPTER FOUR 61
CASE STUDY: THE WORLD BANK 61
4.1 The World Bank 61
4.2 The World Bank Aid 63
4.3 Reorienting the World Bank 68
4.3.1 World Bank Policy Shift: The Comprehensive Development
Framework 69
4.4 Donors Influence on World Bank Aid 72
4.5 THE WORLD BANK AND MOZAMBIQUE'S CASHEW NUTS
PRODUCTION 74
4.5.1 Introduction 74
4.5.2 Cashew Nuts under World Bank Liberalization Policy 76
4.5.3 The First World Bank Study 77
4.5.4 The Second World Bank Study 81
4.6 Conclusion 84
CHAPTER FIVE 87




APPENDIX 1: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS 'TO SELECTED
COUNTRIES IN AFRICA, 1995·2000 108
Vlll
List of Tables
Table 1: Net Official Development Assistance Flows from DAC Countries
(2000-2001) 39
List of Figures




Africa is currently faced with the challenges to accelerate growth, reduce
poverty, build up its human resources, and create an environment that
encourages the development of the private sector. At the same time,
globalization has raised the stakes for many states by offering greater
opportunities for faster economic growth while raising significantly the risk of
marginalization for African countries that fail to integrate into the global
economy. For the past twenty years, the degree of aid dependency in Sub-
Saharan Africa has been growing. For instance, between 1975-1979,
seventeen African countries showed a mean annual Official Development
Assistance (ODA) of over 10 percent of gross national product (GNP). Within
the period 1980-1989, the number of African countries in this heavily aid
dependent category rose to twenty-five. During 1990-1997, there were thirty-
one aid recipients whose ODA averaged more than 10 percent of GN P (World
Bank, 1999). These countries account for about 365 million people or close to
two-third of the sub-Saharan African (SSA) population. Between 1990 and
1998, the number of people living in poverty actually increased in SSA, from
242 million to 291 million. Furthermore, although the number of people living
on less than a dollar each day (absolute poverty) declined in the same period
by 5 percent in other parts of the world, the change in Africa was barely
discernible (Devarajan et aI, 2001: xvii). Social indicators such as level of
literacy, life expectancy, and health have been deteriorating. During the first
half of the 1990s, per capita incomes in Sub-Saharan Africa fell by 1.3 percent
per year. Africa stands out as the worst performing region in the world during
that period. African economies have invested a smaller share of GDP than
comparable regions and a smaller share of investments has gone to the
private sector (Bigsten, 1999: 174).
As a share of GDP, Sub-Saharan Africa receives nearly five times more aid
than any other region. The share of aid to GDP was on average 16 percent in
1994. It was as high as 101 percent in Mozambique and 30 percent in
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Tanzania (Bigsten, 1999: 174). One reason for the high gross flows is the high
debt burden that was accumulated by many African countries from the mid-
1970s onwards. For example, in the Republic of Congo and Mozambique
external debts were more than 300 percent of GNP (World Bank, 1997). In
essence, despite the development efforts of the past twenty years Africans are
getting poorer. In fact, the scale of poverty and suffering on the continent has
remained daunting.
Since the end of the Second World War, economic development in Sub-
Saharan Africa has been disappointing. The increasing integration of national
economies into global markets has changed dramatically (and promises to
continue doing so), the volume and character of international resource flows -
foreign aid inclusive. Globalization is carrying with it the threat of continued
marginalization of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) from the global development
processes. SSA faces marginalization in trade, as preferential trading
arrangements are diluted by moves in the direction of both multilateral trading
arrangements and the associated multilateral tariff reductions. As a whole,
Africa's share in world trade (the bulk of which is still confined to the
exportation of primary goods and the importation of non-primary intermediary,
capital, and consumption goods) has declined considerably in the last three
decades (Wangwe, 1998). Furthermore, the African share of global trade has
declined steadily over the past forty years from 4.1 to 4.9 percent during 1960-
65 to 2.3 percent in the 1990s.
Secondly, the region faces marginalization in investment, one of the critical
ingredients of development. Since the early 1990s, Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) flows have gone to regions with perceived higher returns as a result of
the market size and access to natural resources. In 2000, FDI inflows to Africa
(including South Africa) dropped bringing down the continent's already low
share in world inflows to below one percent (UNCTAD, 2001). FDI declined
from 10.5 billion in 1999 to $9.1 billion in 2000. According to the World
Investment Report 2001, the decline is largely the result of slowdowns in a
small number of countries, including Angola, Morocco, and South Africa -
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Africa's main recipient countries. However, for many nations, FDI continues to
play an important role in financing capital formation 1. In the continent, FDI
continues to concentrate in a small number of countries endowed with
resources, especially oil. FDI inflows to Sub-Saharan Africa are concentrated
in three countries - South Africa, Nigeria, Angola while the rest goes to Egypt,
Morocco, and Sudan in 2000 (UNCTAD, 2001).
Thirdly, the region faces marginalization in rapid global technological advances
due to the absence of requisite financial and human infrastructure to support
such advances. For instance, the global information revolution and, in
particular, the communications sector, seem generally to have bypassed Africa
given that the region accounts for only 2% of the world's telephone lines most
of which are in a few large cities (Wangwe, 1998).
Furthermore, the prospects of future aid flows to SSA remain uncertain due not
only to budgetary pressures in many donor countries but also to cOlTlJeting
claims on donor resources and changes in the ranking of strategic and
economic interests especially following the end of the cold war. The European
Commission (EC), the traditional aid giver to Africa has changed the
distribution as most of its ODA are in favor of other regions. For example,
there was a fall in the real value of EU aid to SSA from over US$2 billion in
1988/89 to $1.6 billion in 1999 (OECD, 2001). This decline shows that the
total EU development aid to SSA dropped dramatically from 61 per cent in
1988/89 to 31.3 percent in 1999, whereas aid to other regions grew from 39 to
68.7 percent in the same period (OECD, 2001). The shift of EU aid flows has
favored Central and Eastern Europe and the new states of the former Soviet
Union.
In absolute terms, Africa's net official development assistance (ODA) receipts
totaled $86.5 billion between 1993-1997 (OECD, 1999). When this figure is
put in perspective, net foreign direct investment in Africa was only $9.5 billion
for the same five-year period (1993-1997) (World Bank, 1999b). This situation
I Table showing the FDI in selected countries as published by World Investment Report 2001. Attached
as appendix 1.
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is exacerbated by a new and highly troubling development. Development aid
is currently facing an unprecedented crisis, which is linked to budget
reductions in developed countries. Between 1992 and 1997, foreign aid from
developed countries decreased by 21 percent, the sharpest decline since the
creation of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In 2000, the
Official Development Assistance/Gross National Income (ODA/GNI) ratio for all
DAC members shifted from 0.24 percent to 0.22 percent, a far cry from the
international target of 0.7 percent and well below the general trend of the past
20years2 . In spite of an ever more sophisticated rhetoric, the developed
countries devote few concrete efforts to poverty alleviation. In 1998, basic
education and health care, received respectively 1.4 percent and 1.7 percent
of all foreign aid. Furthermore, the assistance given to the group of the 48
least developed countries has been on the decline (Therien, 2002: 458).
There are two principal forms of development aid - non-strategic and strategic
- that emerged during the 1940s. On the one hand, non-strategic aid
comprises of multilateral assistance and more altruistic forms of bilateral aid,
which were intended primarily to respond to the objective development needs
of the recipient countries. On the other hand, aid is strategic when it is given
based on geopolitical, historical, or commercial reasons, which serves
respectively the political, cultural and market influence of the donors (Browne,
1999: 14-15). In this study, the word 'aid' will be used to mean official
development assistance (ODA). The guardian of official information about aid
is the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); its annual volume contains
the most commonly used aid statistics (Lancaster, 1999: 189). In principle,
official development assistance is meant to spur economic development in the
recipient countries through the financing of investment projects, research
funding and technical assistance, and support for economic and political
reforms. The issue of foreign aid effectiveness in Africa is an important one.
The widespread practice of tying aid to trade reduces the value of aid for
2 GEeD website: http://www.oecd.org/oecd/pageslhome/displaygeneraI/O,3380,EN-document-590-17-
llo-12-22966-0.FF.html.
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recipients. Indeed, donors, their companies, and their experts retain three-
quarters of the financial value of bilateral technical assistance funds.
Africa starts the 21 st century as the poorest, most technologically backward,
most debt distressed, and most marginalized continent in the world. It
accounts for 12.5 percent of the world's population but produces only 3.7
percent of global GDP (IMF, 1999). In 1999, the life expectancy at birth was
47 years, infant mortality per 1000 birth was 92, while in 2000, the female
illiteracy rate and per capita gross national product (GNP) stood at 26 percent
and $480 respectively (World Bank, 2001: 66). Foreign aid is supposed to
promote development but it has apparently failed to do so in Africa. One
crucial question being asked by experts is, why has there been so little
development in sub-Saharan Africa despite so much aid?
1.2 Research Methodology
This study involves the trends in development aid during the 1990s. The
1990s is used as a point of departure because that decade serves as a unique
'hinge' period between the end of the Cold War and the transformed
international environment. This period coincided with the time that donors'
ODA contributions were at the lowest ebb ever. It also coincided with the
World Bank's grudging admission that the imposition of assistance programs
on the recipient countries was either ineffectual or had a very small
development impact. Foreign aid has been one of the most significant external
links for much of Sub-Saharan Africa. An attempt is made in this study to
examine foreign aid trends as well as their overall effectiveness and
management. The central argument of this study centers on the nature of the
relationships between donors and recipients, which has a critical influence on
the effectiveness of development aid. There has been an unequal relationship
between African governments and their donor partners. Basically, the
relationship has been characterized by the passivity of the recipients and the
dominance of donors. This work, therefore, argues that a transformation in aid
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relations away from fragmented donor-driven projects and programs to a
predictable long-term support to African owned programs is necessary to
foster economic development. The study also attempts to examine other
challenges associated with the low level of aid effectiveness. Equally
examined are the efforts by the World Bank to encourage aid donors and
recipients to work harder towards aid effectiveness. This work addresses
these challenges by review of current debates and analysis of new forms,
instruments, promises, and direction of development cooperation. Donor
discourses which are on ownership, partnership, less conditionalities and more
empowerment are not always followed in practice where there is a variety of
aid instruments for varying purposes and with different objectives. Aid can
only be effective in achieving the objectives set by donors in partnership with
recipients if donors are convinced that reforming the aid system will lead to
less dependency on aid and this will promote growth and development.
1.3 Realist-Idealist Arguments on Foreign Aid
Unfortunately, the ongoing debate over foreign aid regime has remained
controversial in the intellectual world, given that there is a general lack of
scholarly understanding about the determinants of foreign aid programs. In
international relations, there are two leading theories of foreign aid, the realist
paradigm and the idealist paradigm. Over the years, however, realism has
dominated the debate. While realists argue that "foreign aid programs are
shaped with the interests of the aid-giving countries primarily in mind" (Mason
1962:3), the idealists maintain that "aid [is] a response to world poverty which
arose mainly from ethical and humane concern" (Lumsdaine, 1993:3).
1.3.1 The Realist Argument
The dominant conceptual lens for understanding the foreign aid regime of the
cold war era, assume that aid policies are driven primarily by the strategic
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interests of nation-states (Schraeder, et ai, 1998: 297). According to this
viewpoint, international relations are conducted in a Hobbesian state of nature
in which national security and self-preservation become the primary, if not the
exclusive, objectives of states. As a result, foreign aid is perceived as only
minimally related to recipient economic development and the humanitarian
needs of recipient countries are downplayed (1998: 297). Realists argue that
states are the principal or the most important actors on the international
political stage (Viotti & Kauppi, 1993: 5). States act to maximize what is often
called the "national interest". As a way of thinking about the world, realism is
distinguished by its "pessimism regarding moral progress and human
possibilities" (Gilpin, 1984: 304). This pessimism is rooted in both human
nature and the intemational system.
Sarah Tisch and Michael Wallace (1994: 70) in their book, "Dilemmas of
Development Assistance", assert that most realists believe that
"...development aid is a tool used by states to help maintain the status quo of
the international system". In addition, they argue that all states act to
maximize their self-interest. In other words, while rich states donate money to
improve their international economic position, the poor states accept money to
build their economies and strengthen their governments (Tisch and Wallace,
1994: 70). The realist argument throws light on the role of government in
developing economies such as those of African states. A government is
obligated to play an integral role in its economy. The realists argue that the
"government in developing country should implement protectionist policies,
such as imposing tariffs, in order to help the economy to grow" (Tisch &
Wallace, 1994: 70).
The sovereignty of a nation-state is crucial in realist theory. In this case, a
state gives aid in order to maximize its own interests; therefore, a donor can
attach conditions to the fund, which would benefit it, and not the recipient
country. Obviously, this could weaken seriously a state's ability to make its
own policy decisions. However, if a needy nation decides not to accept
conditional aid, its sovereignty may still be weakened through poverty and the
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resulting inability to control economic and social problems (Tisch & Wallace,
1994: 68).
Kanbur et al (1999) argue that the lack of recipient ownership in the
development process is due to more than just a recipient country's weak
leverage with donors. They maintain that even if the system was changed to
include input from recipient governments, it is unclear whether that input would
reflect the needs of their citizens. Many developing countries lack the
analytical skills to identify effectively their own priorities and projects that need
funding. As such, they are often unable to assai their needs to donors.
Kanbur et al also maintain that even if central govemments have that capacity,
they often do not encourage ownership of the development process on the part
of their citizens, often the ones who are most affected by the success or failure
of the reform or project. Many developing countries lack transparency,
accountability, and public discussion that allow citizens to participate
effectively in government activities (Kanbur et ai, 1999: 23-24). A collaborative
research on Africa by van de Walle and Johnston concluded:
Because they rarely encourage policy debates about the use of aid
resources, central administrations rarely understand the needs and
priorities of the local communities. Even the projects that ministry
officials understand and support may not be owned by the beneficiaries
themselves [sic] (van de Walle & Johnston, 1997: 55).
Kanbur et al conclude that simply receiving aid flows has often been more
important to the recipient country governments than ensuring that the aid funds
projects and reforms desired by its people. Ironically, this lack of 'ownership'
has meant that the money they have received has had much less benefit on
ordinary citizens than it should have had (Kanbur et ai, 1999: 24).
1.3.2 The Idealist Argument
The idealists' start from a principle that Roger Riddell has tailored down to a
few words: "aid is a moral issue" (Riddell, 1987:17). They argue that the
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governments of developed countries have a moral obligation to provide foreign
aid to the less fortunate developing countries. In the words of Miller and
Feinberg:
Development should be understood as a process designed
progressively to create conditions in which every person can enjoy,
exercise and utilize under the Rule of Law, all his human rights, whether
economic, social, cultural or political. Every person has the right to
participate in, and benefit from, development in the sense of a
progressive improvement in the standard and quality of life. The
primary obligation to provide development, in such a way as to satisfy
this right, rests upon each state for its own territory and for the persons
under its jurisdiction. As the development process is a necessary
condition for peace and friendship between nations, it is a matter of
international concern, imposing responsibilities upon all states. A state
promoting its own development within its available resources is entitled
to the support of other states in the implementation of its policies
(Riddell, 1987: 24).
Idealists emphasize that the benefits of assistance are relatively large in
proportion to the long-term costs of not assisting needy countries. The idealist
adherents challenge the realist assumptions in every respect, advancing a
vision that is not only more positive regarding the motivations of individuals
and state actors but also more optimistic about their potential for cooperative
relations. Contrary to the realist argument that the state is obligated to pursue
narrowly defined national interests, idealists lay emphasis on the rule of law,
international organization, and morality. Power is not seen as the major
influence on the international stage. They perceive human nature as
fundamentally good (unlike the realists who see human beings as bad and
motivated by their self interests). To idealists, a conception of interstate
relations that is based on relentless competition, ignores the record of
cooperation that emerged in the late twentieth century, and serves as a self-
fulfilling prophesy of future conflict. Unlike their realist counterparts, idealists
are particularly optimistic about the potential utility of foreign aid for
ameliorating Third World poverty and promoting broadly shared economic
development.
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The above discussions on realist and idealist paradigms illustrate the
substantive and undercurrent principles that help to give shape to the foreign
aid policies of governments. These two perspectives have influenced the
giving and receiving of development assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa and
elsewhere. In this study, the realist approach will be employed in assessing
the effectiveness of foreign aid in enhancing African economic development.
Clearly, states are unified actors with distinct national interests, which arise not
only from their cultural values but also as a result of their specific position and
circumstances within a competitive global environment. Therefore, aid is used
by governments to advance their national interests, whether diplomatic,
commercial or cultural. Foreign aid business involves a bargaining process.
The donors want a specific set of outcomes in return for their aid. To enhance
their chances of achieving those outcomes, donors often impose conditions for
their aid and insist on the compliance of recipients for continued aid
disbursements. Recipients, of course, want aid without conditions. These
donor-recipient exchanges can be considered the strategic result of
cooperative bargaining games. Acceptable outcomes for players are aid
arrangements within each player's win set, varying according to which side
pulls the other closest to its preferred position (Kanbur et ai, 1999:2). This has
resulted in a plethora of highly differentiated and diversified aid delivery
systems within the recipient countries. These dynamics have led to the current
unsatisfactory system - a system that, because of its high degree of
intrusiveness, creates aid dependence and undermines ownership by the




2.1 Historical Background of Foreign Aid
Foreign aid was a product of the immediate post-World War 11 period that saw
the creation of the United Nations (UN), the beginning of decolonisation, and
the inception of an East-West struggle for ideological influence and hegemony.
The origins of aid determined the motivations that fuelled its steady growth
(Browne, 1999: 5). Indeed, since the success of the Marshall Plan in
promoting the economic recovery of Western Europe in the immediate post-
war period, economic aid has been considered an important means of
assisting the economic development of poor countries. A considerable
literature has grown around the role and significance of foreign aid in the
development process. In a well-known 'two_gap' model elaborated by Chenery
and Strout (1966), aid promoted development by adding to domestic savings
as well as foreign exchange availability, thus helping either the savings-
investment gap or the export-import gap. Some authors, however, queried
whether aid did, in fact, have a beneficial impact on growth, pointing to the
inverse relationship that appears to exist between investment and domestic
savings, and the likelihood that aid will increase the capital output ratio (Bauer,
1971; 1991: 55). These arguments, in turn, have been sharply criticized
mainly on the grounds of misrepresentation of a complex relationship - the
assertion is that a model that allowed for the interrelationships between aid
and savings, and investment and growth would show that aid could influence
both investment and growth positively (Hoy, 1998: 12).
Whether or not foreign aid will promote economic development in particular
cases -evidently, much depends on the type of aid, its terms and conditions,
its links with trade and other financial flows and its relevance to overcoming
specific development constraints - the underlying assumption of the
development aid literature has almost invariably been that aid is given by
donors for the purpose of promoting development (Maizels & Nissanke, 1984:
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879). Particularly, during the earlier decades of post-WW 11 aid, the message
of official aid reports generally tended to stress the humanitarian aspects of aid
as well as its usefulness in promoting social stability in the recipient countries.
The development motif of aid has continued to be an important element in
official reports of donor governments as well as the reports of the principal
international donor body, the DECD Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) (Maizels & Nissanke, 1984: 879). At the same time, many donor
governments have indicated that, in their aid allocations, they also take their
national interests into account, whether these be conceived largely in terms of
maintaining spheres of influence, political or military alliances, or simply
promoting their own export trade.
2.2 Theories of Foreign Aid
There is a large and diverse literature on the impact of foreign aid on
development. However, because of the conceptual difficulties and
controversial nature of many of the ideas, this study will offer only the most
summary description in order to indicate the location of this research in a
broader discourse. This discourse on aid and development has taken place at
both theoretical and empirical levels, and in a number of disciplines
(Lancaster, 1999: 5).
The literature that has evaluated the impact of foreign aid on development falls
into two broad approaches - the contextual and instrumental approaches. The
contextual approach tends to be more theoretical and considers the impact of
aid on development as a function of the broader economic and political context
in which it is provided. The instrumental approach is more empirically oriented
and evaluates the impact of aid largely in terms of the success and failure of
the program and project it finances (Lancaster: 1999: 5), which relies on in-
depth research or case studies of particular foreign aid programs. The
empirical literature thus far is inclusive. The qualitative literature generally
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argues that foreign aid can help development if the policy environment is
favorable to growth.
The contextual approach is an umbrella designation that includes many
approaches. One such approach, which is associated with writers such as
Andre Gunder Frank (1967), Samir Amin (1973), and Waiter Rodney (1972),
tends to emphasize the relations of power between the rich and poor
countries. For example, the dependency school of thought views
underdevelopment and poverty as a consequence of the exploitation by
powerful capitalist countries. Dependentistas have viewed cid as a tool of
capitalism to reinforce exploitative behavior and, therefore, deepen
underdevelopment and poverty (Hayter, 1981:1971: 83).
Another development theory that is closely related to the dependency school
emerged in the 1970s. This is called the 'World System Theory', which is
associated with theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) and Albert
Bergesen (1983). Their analyses were on a global level; a three-tier model of
'core', 'periphery', and 'semi-periphery', which divides the world into three
zones that are defined on the basis of a society's level of development and
incorporation into the world system, and the political-economic content of such
incorporation. The main feature of the modern world system is the transfer of
surplus from the periphery to the core of the system, which was
conceptualized in a manner similar to the Frankian 'metropolis-satellite' model
of domination and exploitation.
Furthermore, another related approach on development aid emerged in the
1990s. Like the dependency school, Deconstructionism was inspired partly by
the great disparity of power between the rich, developed West and the poorer
developing regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This approach is
associated with anthropologists such as Arturo Escobar (1995: 9) who argued
that the idea of development and the concepts and discourse it has
engendered is an invention of Western capitalism, with the intention of creating
an avenue for the exercise of power over the Third World. In this conception,
the writer views foreign aid as a tool for the exercise of power, with little
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relevance to the lives of the recipients. Also Bauer and Yamey (1982) state,
"The foreign aid that created [the Third World] did not originate from the
pressure on the Third World, but rather was introduced and organized by the
West. Thus by foreign aid did the West create a Third World, and one hostile
in itself'.
Another approach, which has been the main influence on aid policies is
provided by the laissez faire development specialists. These laissez faire
specialists who were popular during the 1950s and 1960s viewed
underdevelopment as a result of the lack of savings and investment in poor
countries. Tony Killick (1986) defines this period as the 'dirigiste period'. He
argues that economists in this period put emphasis on maximizing economic
growth, which they believed would be achieved by a planned program of
massive investment and industrialization. Economic policy in this period
stressed planning, active state involvement in economic activity and an inward-
looking strategy of industrialization (Killick, 1986: 99). The countries that
pursued these policy prescriptions faithfully would expand gradually their
economic sectors until their entire population received the benefits of modern
society. This was a 'production-centered' strategy for development. Economic
growth and investment would eventually translate into benefits for people by
means of the 'trickle-down' effect. The dominant constraints to economic
growth were widely seen as internal rather than external - partly in indigenous
institutions and attitudes, but as stated above, for many the overriding
constraint was seen to lie in the low rate of savings of national income (Hunt,
1989: 51). Furthermore, it was assumed that states (including the poor
countries) could plan and implement effective development policies and
programs. Where state capacity was weak, technical assistance could
overcome that weakness. Deficiencies in resources could be remedied with
increased amount of money and technical assistance from external sources in
the form of concessional loans and grants from foreign governments. Foreign
aid would thus help stimulate growth and reduce poverty. This was the view
articulated by Hollis Chenery and Alan Strout (1966: 680).
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The traditional development theory thus holds that development is primarily a
function of capital investment; and that the greater the flow of capital in the
form of foreign investment and official development assistance (ODA) to
poorer countries, the more their development. Economic development was
equated with rising national per capita income.
This approach was challenged by the work of Peter Bauer (1971: 126-127)
who was skeptical of the ability of states to play a positive role in managing
development but much more confident of the ability of markets (if left alone by
governments) to spur growth. He argued that the main impediments to growth
were misguided government policies and that foreign aid would simply
strengthen and even expand those impediments.
The 1980s and 1990s saw a mixture of these two contrary views of the
capacity and roles of states and markets and their implications for foreign aid.
The failure of many states in the developing world to promote healthy growth
led the laissez faire economists to argue that the influence of states over
markets needed to be circumscribed. Anne Krueger (1986) asserts that
foreign aid could be effective in promoting development when provided to
states as an incentive to encourage policy and for regulating reforms, which
would free markets and stimulate investment and growth (Krueger, 1986: 57-
78).
The evolutionary optimism for the future of the developing countries is
epitomized in the work of Waiter Rostow, one of the principal architects of
modernization theory. Roger Riddell believes Rostow"can be seen as the
bridge between the politics and economics of aid" (Riddell, 1987: 87). Rostow
argues that in time all societies would become liberal capitalist democracies.
Through a process of economic growth, developing countries would arrive at
the 'take-off stage. Rostow believed that aid had a very important role to play
in economic development:
The assistance which countries need from outside if they are to develop
is of two kinds. In the first place they need capital, both to establish the
preconditions of growth and make sure during the second stage that
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growth is maintained until they reach a point where they can be
reasonably sure of maintaining it out of their own increasing output ...
But in addition to capital they will also need a great deal of technical
assistance, a transfer of knowledge and skills from other parts of the
world, to permit them to make effective use of both their own meagre
supplies of capital and of whatever capital is available from abroad...
(Millikan & Rostow, 1957: 49-65).
Rostow further asserts that aid is only needed in the period prior to 'take-off. It
is not that extemal capital is no longer required but rather that at this stage the
normal channel of international capital supply can be relied on to take over the
burden of any net capital inflow still required (Millikan & Rostow, 1957: 54).
Like many growth theorists, Rostow sees aid as an interim measure, which
seeks to give developing countries a helping hand on their road to self-
sustaining development.
Foreign investment provides the stimulus for growth while foreign aid, in the
form of grant and technical assistance, provides a boost for the economy in
order for the country to make the optimum use of both domestic and foreign
investments. Diana Hunt (1989) highlights the fact that Rostow's theory
exerted significant influence on foreign aid analysis from the mid-1950s to mid-
1960s. This was particularly so in the discussion of a country's 'absorptive
capacity' - the ability to absorb effectively an increase in investment made
possible by financial aid (Hunt, 1989: 105). Rostow emphasises the
importance of institutional change and change in the values and beliefs of
traditional societies as a precondition for successful take-off. This is often an
aspect which critics of modernization theory overlook, deriding such theorists
for only paying lip-service to the multi-disciplinary nature of the problems of
development (Higgot, 1983: 20). However, David Korten (1991), in an article
entitled "People-centered Development: Alternative for a world Crisis", argues
that even when modemization theorists do consider people's participation, it is
only in terms of their economic functions as labourers and consumers (Korten,
1991: 7).
In assessing the impact of foreign aid on development using the instrumental
approach, the writer Graham Hancock (1989) asserted that as a tool for
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development foreign aid is fundamentally flawed by the misguided policies,
bureaucratic inefficiency, self-interest, and corruption of officials of aid
agencies and should be terminated. A more important contribution to the
instrumental approach of assessing aid and development, although more
sober and balanced, were the works of Howard White (1992), Paul Mosley
(1995), and Peter Boone (1994). This group of writers assessed the impact of
aid based on available evaluations, studies and other empirical materials.
They examined the statistical relationship between aid flows and economic
growth, and found no significant or systematic relationship between aid and
growth but suggested that aid either was too small to have impact or was not
able to deliver the growth benefits it promised. A 1996 quantitative study done
by Craig Burnside and David Dollar of the World Bank found that when.
monetary, fiscal, and trade policies in recipient countries were taken into
account aid had a positive impact on growth in supportive policy environments
(Lancaster, 1999: 9).
Another group of analysts took a different approach. Robert Cassen (1994)
examined the evaluation of a large number of aid-funded projects and
programs in various parts of the world and concluded that aid was effective in
achieving its goals most of the time. Where aid was ineffective, Cassen
referred to the donors' multiple goals other than development as the key factor.
For example, in Kenya, the multiple objectives (commercial, geo-political,
bureaucratic, and humanitarian) of donors strongly influenced aid programs.
The net result in some sectors was greater capital intensity than is warranted
by the country's factor endowment. Other scholars such as Paul Mosley, Jane
Harrigan, and John Toye (1992) examined aid for policy reform and found a
mixed record of effectiveness in World Bank structural-adjustment lending
(SAL), with political conditions in borrowing countries themselves playing a key
role. In a study for the World Bank, Tony Killick (1991) primarily blamed
recipient countries' policies for apparent failure to improve economic
performance. Like Cassen, Killick identified the non-developmental goals of
donors as a contributor to the poor performance of aid.
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A study conducted by Oxfam (non-govemmental organization) in 2002, asserts
that there is a glaring absence of accountability on the part of donors and the
recipients. They concluded that only by ending the 'business as usual'
approach to Africa can the situation change (Oxfam, 2002). The growing
strength of African civil society, combined with the efforts by some African
leaders to chart a new course, appears to give Africa a real chance of tackling
the root causes of poverty and conflict in the continent. African leaders, under
the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) initiative, are working
together with G8 leaders to tackle these problems, which offer new
opportunities to finally redress the failures and develop a new basis for
partnership with the region.
This study builds on the findings of many earlier studies of foreign aid
effectiveness in achieving set objectives and development. The study agrees
with Graham Hancock (1989: 189) who asserted that as a tool for
development, foreign aid has failed due to misguided policies, bureaucratic
inefficiency, corruption, and self-interest on the part of donors but disagrees
with him that aid should be terminated. Rather than terminating aid projects,
aid donors and recipients should work toward achieving consensus on how
best to work together and effectively in fomenting economic development.
This could be achieved where the donors are called upon to provide adequate
levels of resources to reinforce local capacities and to improve the coherence
and coordination of their aid policies. The recipients, for their part, may be
asked to adopt sound macroeconomic and fiscal policies and to foster the rule
of law. This was the vision articulated in Shaping the 21st Century published
by the OEeD in 1996.
This study argues that the recipients would do better with less traditional
patronage and more opportunities to take control of their own destinies. The
opportunities to do so today are greater than they have ever been and the
development assistance efforts of the international community should
concentrate on enhancing Africa's prospects.
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2.3 Perspectives on the Rationale for Foreign Aid
There are proponents and critics of foreign aid. The arguments on aid have
been seen from two perspectives, moral and economic points of view. The
moral arguments are clearly normative or value-laden, with no real possibilities
of assessing their validity. In contrast, evidence can be gathered to test the
economic consequences of aid - although different interpretations of the
evidence are always possible and disagreements over the conclusiveness of
the test are common.
2.3.1 Moral Argument for Aid
According to Roger Riddell (1987), the moral argument on foreign aid has
three propositions. First, is the absolute argument for aid; this reflects altruism
or concern for the welfare of others. Essentially, human beings have basic
needs that must be met for a decent existence. When possible, efforts to
relieve human suffering should be made. Therefore, aid to help poor is
justified (Riddell, 1987: 117). Bauer discarded the absolute argument for aid,
saying: "Global egalitarianism is based on the idea that people's requirements
are fundamentally the same everywhere" (1987: 118). This idea is obviously
unfounded.
Second is the relative argument for aid. The gap between rich and poor
nations is large and growing - as they are in many nations, between the
upper- and lower-income classes. A redistribution of resources from the rich to
the poor should subtract less from the utility of the rich than it adds to the utility
of the poor. In the words of Arthur Lewis, "the need to reduce a wide and
widening gap in incomes between rich and poor countries is now much
invoked in support of international wealth transfers" (Bauer, 1981: 120). Thus,
total utility may be increased with more egalitarian distribution of income and
resources. It should be noted that there are aid advocates who maintain that
this idea is irrelevant to the case. Classical macroeconomic theory assumes
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that utility is not cardinal (that is, it cannot be quantitatively measured) and that
interpersonal comparisons of utility cannot be made. Bauer argues that while
aid certainly removes resources from the donors, it does not necessarily, or
even generally, raise income in the recipient countries. It may, therefore, not
reduce the gap between them (Bauer, 1981: 120).
The third moral argument for aid is based on restitution or redressing the past
injustices inflicted on the poor nations by the rich nations during the colonial
period. This is in line with the claims of the radical (Marxist) school of
development, which asserted that the underdevelopment of the Third World
nations is due to exploitation by the developed countries. Thus, the developed
countries are morally obliged to compensate the less developed countries for
past transgressions (Riddell, 1987: 117). Lord Bauer (1981: 122) argued that
the acceptance of the idea of restitution may serve to reinforce the feelings of
guilt in the West, but feelings of guilt unaccompanied by a sense of
responsibility for the consequences of the policies inspired by them have
brought about results which are extremely harmful to many of those affected
by these policies. Bauer not only discounts the need for aid, but also
maintained that although poverty is endemic, people are poor either by choice
or defect of character. He contends that: "a disproportionate number of the
poor lack the capabilities and inclination for economic achievement, and often
for cultural achievement as well" (Bauer, 1981: 114). Bauer concluded, "the
attitudes, values and beliefs, which keep many people poor, are often an
integral part of their lives. They often also give meaning to their lives, so that
attempts forcibly to eradicate them could lead to spiritual collapse" (Bauer,
1981: 115).
Like Bauer, other critics argue that ODA is unnecessary, ineffective, and even
counterproductive. Moreover, the moral basis for aid is disputed. Some reject
the notion that nations or governments have any obligation or right to
intervene, whether to relieve sUffering or address basic needs or promote
development. Individuals of course, are free to contribute to charities and
international agencies of their choice. Governments, however, should not
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impose philanthropy on taxpayers by using tax revenues for foreign aid.
Bauer's arguments notwithstanding, Roger Riddell (1987) concluded that the
moral basis for aid is legitimized if foreign aid does help or has the potential of
helping to meet the needs of the poor in developing countries (Riddell, 1987:
15).
2.3.2 Economic Argument for Aid
Foreign aid can help to cover a balance of trade deficit without adding to
foreign indebtedness. When received, foreign aid is a credit on the current
account of the balance of payments. It is a unilateral transfer of resources that
can be used to relax factor scarcities that constrain growth and development.
For example, grants of foreign exchange can allow recipient nations to import
needed intermediate and capital goods. Investments are important for
economic growth and development - in the infrastructure (transportation,
telecommunications, power generations, and the water and sanitation
systems) and in human capital formation, public education, primary health
care, and child nutrition. These costly public investments, while yielding high
social retums in the long run, are often beyond the budgets of governments in
developing economies. Foreign aid can be vital, therefore, especially for the
low-income economies, not only for funding but also for technical expertise in
devising and implementing the development projects.
Furthermore, public sector investments on the physical infrastructure and
human resource development should complement more direct productive
private-sector investments in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, and services.
For example, investing in a high quality public education system will yield a
literate and skilled labor force available for employment in the private sector.
An efficient transportation network will increase the productivity and
international competitiveness of the private sector. In short, public investment
can enhance and stimulate private investment, both domestic and foreign, in a
nation. Foreign aid can promote not only the growth and development of the
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recipient countries but also it may produce dividends for donor nations. Rising
per capita incomes and expanding markets in the less developed countries
(LOCs) are good for the exports, national incomes, and employment in the
developed countries. Economic progress may promote political stability.
Economic liberalization fostered through foreign aid may encourage political
liberalization and more democratic forms of government. Furthermore,
economic development leads to lower fertility rates, relieving population
pressures on resources and environment (Bauer, 1981: 126). Clearly, the net
effect of effective foreign aid is positive and beneficial to both recipients and
donors.
2.4 Donor Interests: Scholarly Perspectives
There are several issues that are related to foreign aid, which generated a
body of literature (Serageldin, 1995: 13). These issues can be divided into two
broad groups: the motivation for aid and the effectiveness of aid in achieving
greater welfare for people in the recipient country. Nevertheless, it is important
to recognize that in many donor countries political issues, especially during the
cold war, were behind the support for aid. Political motives have not been
universal, however. The motivation for aid has ranged from pure 'altruism' -
that is, concern for the poor and for correcting unequal distribution of income,
especially due to a lack of natural resources - to the pursuit of national
objectives, such as national security and commercial benefits (Eaton, 1989;
Browne, 1999: 1). Although some studies have shown that bilateral aid tends
to be driven by the donors' perceived national interests rather than by
humanitarian needs or what the developing countries perceive as their
economic needs (Serageldin, 1995: 14), Eaton (1989) argues: "Once
multilateral aid is taken into account there is more evidence that the recipient
needs are an issue". Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has
been concerned about the potential spread of weapons of mass destruction,
especially if combined with political instability. The U.S. maintains that if
internal conflict in a developing country becomes a regional conflict, it could
22
have dire consequences for her allies if it involves the use of nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons - not to mention the potential impact on the
regional and global environment. The foreign aid spending of other bilateral
donors has also tended to follow their political or economic interests. Japan,
for instance, devotes the majority of its aid to countries in Asia with which it
has strong economic ties. France gives most if its aid to its former colonies, as
does Britain (Cassen, 1994: 205). In contrast, some of the aid donors, such as
the countries of Scandinavia, tend to devote their resources to countries that
they perceive as being the most needy (O'Neil, 1997: 35).
There are different motives behind the giving of aid, as are the definitions of
what actually comprises aid. Projects and programs, which have received aid,
have been varied and there have been varied levels of successes (Bean,
1994: 47). As has been stated previously, aid is used synonymously in this
study with Official Development Assistance (ODA), and broadly follows the
definition established by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) in the 1960s. According to Robert Cassen:
A large proportion of aid has never been subjected to evaluation. The
project evaluations that exist are frequently not comparable. Even
without such difficulties, there are unfathomable questions about the
interaction between aid activities and the milieu of policies and
circumstances in which they are conducted. Clearly, the precise degree
of the effectiveness of aid is in the end unknowable (Cassen, 1994: 1).
Analyzing the effectiveness of foreign aid has been one of the major problems
with which aid analysts have to grapple with. The latest academic evidence
suggested that donors had little control over how a recipient govemment used
the funds for a particular project. Aid was so highly 'fungible' that to a
considerable extent donors were in reality augmenting the resources available
to the government (Collier & Dollar, 2001: 1). A study carried out by Boone
(1995) showed that aid had no significant effect on growth. This implies that
despite the appearance that aid was channeled by donor agencies into useful
development projects, in reality, aid was under the control of recipient
governments, which were wasting it (Collier & Dollar, 2001: 2). Furthermore,
some antagonists of aid have argued that foreign aid does not contribute
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significantly to economic progress in developing countries. Aid that was
intended to foster development may enable some regimes to divert money to
other, perhaps unproductive activities. They continued that aid is wasted in
countries that do not have technical or administrative ability to absorb and use
it properly. Furthermore, the recipients of aid may use it to fund projects that
are poorly conceived and planned. For instance, roads or other large projects
may be built and left un-maintained and unused. This would lead to the
destruction of more productive resources that could be put into other use
(O'Neil, 1997).
While some writings on aid condemn the whole enterprise, there are also
favorable accounts of aid (Sogge, 1996: 11). A study of the experiences of
seven countries in SSA indicated that in all of them except Botswana there
have been more failures than successes (Carlsson et aI, 1997). However, the
case studies also demonstrate that aid to Africa has some notable
achievements to its credit. Alongside many disappointments, aid has financed
many development projects and programs which achieved high internal rates
of return, including schools, health centers, bridges, roads, and manpower
training programs (1997).
An earlier work on aid by Robert Cassen, "Does Aid Work?', shares the view
that there is nothing wrong with aid, but that its virtue is not to be taken for
granted.
In the broadest sense, this report finds that most aid does indeed 'work'.
It succeeds in achieving its developmental objectives (where those are
primary), contributing positively to the recipient countries' economic
performance, and not substituting for activities that would have occurred
anyway (Cassen, 1994: 7).
Another attempt at a nuanced analysis of aid effectiveness was Burnside and
Dollar (2000) who argued that aid is more effective in better policy
environments. Contrary to the views expressed in the work of Cassen and
Burnside & Dollar, Graham Hancock (1989) asserts that his book is an attack
on official aid organizations. He defined aid as:
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A publicly-funded enterprise, charged with grave intemational
responsibilities, that has not only been permitted to wall off its inner
workings from public view but that also sets its own goals, establishes
how these goals are to be attained and in due course passes judgment
on its own efforts (Hancock, 1989: xiv).
Hancock concludes that aid has developed a life of its own away from public
scrutiny and accountability. It is a dangerous tool in the hands of donors, who
are able to reconstruct and change intemational relationships in line with their
own principles and goals of the donors themselves (Bean, 1994: 48). Hancock
believes that local-level initiatives, relevant and realistic strategies, and the
energy and enterprise of the poor in the Third World have been ignored. He
concluded that "aid is not bad, however, because it is sometimes misused,
corrupt, or crass; rather it is inherently bad, bad to the bone, and utterly
beyond reform" (Hancock, 1989: 182-183).
Peter Bauer, a strong opponent of foreign aid states further that:
Whatever happens in the recipient countries can be adduced to support
the maintenance or extension of aid. Progress is evidence of its
efficacy and so an argument for its expansion; lack of progress is
evidence that the dosage has been insufficient and must be increased.
Some advocates argue that it would be inexpedient to deny aid to the
speedy (those that advance); others, that it would be cruel to deny it to
the needy (those who stagnate). Aid is thus like champagne: in
success you deserve it, in failure you need it (Bauer, 1981: 90-91).
Peter Bauer has argued that aid has serious, distorting consequences in the
political life of recipient countries. Aid is generally transferred to the
government of those countries, which tends to increase not only the
government's power, resources, and patronage relative to the rest of society
but also the stakes in any struggle for control of that power. People will spend
relatively more of their time focused on the outcome of political administrative
decisions, thereby diverting attention, energy, and resources from more
productive activities. This may encourage tension and disturbances that can
lead to the outbreak of civil armed conflict (Bauer, 1991: 9).
In many cases, foreign aid has sustained governments in their pursuit of
economically counterproductive political and economic policies. Such policies
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include the persecution of particular groups, restrictions on private sector and
the inflow of private capital and enterprises, confiscation of property, price
policies that discourage agricultural production, and the expropriation of
foreign capital and enterprises. To add salt to injury, when the pursuit of such
policies worsens the economic performance of an aid recipient, the country
may qualify for still more aid because its situation is deteriorating (Bauer, 1991:
9-10).
Contrary to Bauer's view of foreign aid, Neil Karunaratne (1979: 184)
categorically stated that aid is the 'engine of development' in the less
developed countries. Teresa Hayter (1971:9) contends that any contribution of
aid to the welfare of the Third World is incidental and must be balanced
against the negative effect. She went further to state: "aid can be regarded as
a concession by the imperialist powers to enable them to continue their
exploitation of the semi-colonial countries" (Hayter, 1971: 9).
The above introduction provides a glimpse into the complex debate
surrounding the effectiveness of foreign aid. The roles, motives and also its
definition will be treated in the subsequent sections. Stephen Browne (1999),
states that donors have provided aid partly because many of their actions have
made it necessary. He also argues that aid is never given freely. He warns
that to an un-diminishing degree aid is bound up in packages, which attract the
eye but constrain the hand, of the recipient. (Browne, 1999: 5). This is
underscored by the central argument of this study, which maintains that a
transformation in aid relations away from fragmented donor-driven projects to
predictable long-term support to African owned programs is necessary to
foster economic development.
Traditionally, aid is situated within the context of donor countries' development
cooperation policies that in turn are defined by various other considerations
such as their foreign and security interests and policies. The 'motivating
factors' affect the administration and the impact of foreign aid by undermining
ownership and, therefore, the sustainability of the African development
process (http://www.afrodad.org/html/aid.htm). The ten countries that are
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home to two thirds of the world's poorest people receive only one third of all
aid; in other words, the richest 40 percent of developing countries receive
twice as much aid as the poorest 40 percent (UNDP, 1996: 51). For instance,
Egypt and Israel whose economies are far stronger than those of almost every
country in Africa, receive nearly a quarter of all United States foreign aid, most
of which are military or strategic assistance (Hoy, 1998: 23). For the most
part, aid policies are focused on specific countries rather than on broad
objectives such as alleviating poverty. Evidence has shown that while donors
use aid to create and foster the impression among the recipient countries that
aid is beneficial to them, aid has failed to improve the situation of the poor as it
has promoted the real interest of donors (Lahiri & Raimondos-M0l1er, 1999:
21). It is commonly believed that often the donors give aid with the
understanding that the recipients in return would import more from the donor
countries. On the other hand, African countries are compelled to accept aid as
a result of their continued weakness and economic vulnerability and in view of
their urgent short term needs.
Carol Lancaster has argued that the aid policy of donors and aid allocations
were not always based on considerations of promoting economic and social
development in African countries. She maintained that in a number of cases in
Africa, aid was provided for purely "political reasons". With huge pressures
from legislators, it was not surprising that a situation emerged in which aid was
used to support corrupt governments. She went further to state that the poor
allocative choice and faulty implementation of aid are caused by the fact that
most aid agencies are "political entities" and, therefore, are subject to all types
of pressures. Furthermore, aid agencies not only lack adequate capacity
despite expanded missions and mandates but also the leverage to implement
programs and projects that would yield high returns to human development in
Africa. Moreover, it has been observed that aid agencies were often under
pressure to spend available resources as quickly as possible for political
reasons and to support their governments' non-economic agendas and in
ways that favor particular leaders. Consequently, donors' policies and
practices were partly responsible for the problem of aid ineffectiveness in
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Africa. Lancaster further argued that the bureaucratic procedures of agencies
had been a major contributory factor to their inefficiencies. Moreover,
duplication of efforts by numerous agencies and non-governmental
organizations was not uncommon in Africa. She stressed the importance that
donors and aid recipients reevaluate the institutional framework for aid delivery
and the need to review "aid targets", hence, the need for redesigning the aid
relationship
(http://www.uneca.org/ecaresources/MajorECAWebsites/joinUpanel.htm).
2.5 FOREIGN AID: ITS SOURCES, NATURE AND IMPACT IN AFRICA
2.5.1 Introduction
This section seeks to examine the economic impact of aid. Here, the key
aspects of foreign aid and development, specifically the impact of the policy
and institutional environment in African countries, and the political relationships
between African governments and aid donors will be examined.
There has been continuous debate in the development front (particularly in the
Western world) that the economic policies adopted by African governments
after independence inhibited the ability of aid to contribute to the continent's
development, as much as they inhibited development itself. Prior to the
introduction of structural adjustment policies in the 1980s, many African
countries were in serious economic crisis, which soon required urgent external
response. The oil price shocks of the early 1970s and the related inflationary
pressures not only plunged the global economy into a tailspin but also pushed
much of Africa's already fragile economies to the brink of collapse. This was
due to the abrupt shift and adverse effects of the resulting negative terms of
trade. As pervasive economic stagnation and balance of payments
disequilibria set in, many African countries sought help in the strong western
capital markets awash with petro-dollars. By 1980, the combined effects of the
stagnation and extensive borrowing "left most of the economies severely
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stressed, in debt, and in dire need of structural reconstruction" (Uzodike, 1996:
25). Unfortunately, as the need arose for intervention by the international
community, the crisis that soon followed the Mexican default in 1982 served to
accelerate the shortage of capital flows to developing countries - further
exacerbating the African crisis (Uzodike, 1996: 26). These impulses combined
to motivate what Nicolas van de Walle (2001) called the "adjustment regime".
The purposes of the adjustment regime were to manage Africa's economic
crisis, with the ultimate objective of promoting stability in the region, while
simultaneously pushing through fundamental reforms. The introduction of
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) was not only seen as a shift in World
Bank policy but also as introducing profoundly destabilizing effects on the
implementing governments. Beyond those, the shift effectively blocked a
major alternative source of non-policy based lending while simultaneously
serving to increase the level and intensity of external conditionality and African
dependence (Uzodike, 1996: 26; van de Walle, 2001: 213).
SAP policies have not provided the panacea that the World Bank and the IMF
expected. Indeed, for the whole of the 1980s, the net aggregate effect of
reforms on the adjusting countries was largely negligible or negative. Although
there were a few isolated cases of strong performances such as Ghana, close
examination often led to controversies about the nature and quality of the
improvements. Nevertheless, since the 1990s, there have been substantial
improvements in economic performances of many African countries with
average growth rates of about four percent. Indeed, the strong performances
of countries such as Botswana, Mauritius, and South Africa have coincided
with the opening up of these countries to foreign investments and efforts to
increase participation in world trade. Political and economic reforms have
created hope that in the new millennium, Africa will be more integrated into
global trade, finance, investments and communications2.
Clearly, foreign aid has provided one of the most significant external links for
much of Africa. In order to attract the much needed development assistance,
2 http://www.unu.edulhg/academic/pgarea4/Wangwe.html
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African leaders came up in 2001 with a new development framework, the New
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). A look at NEPAD's documents
and speeches by people close to the idea shcms the advantage NEPAD
enjoys over its predecessors. According to the inaugural Africa Union
chairperson, President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, the brain behind NEPAD
and the man credited with propelling the idea to the top levels of the industrial
world, it is a program of Africans by Africans for Africans. Africans will be
responsible for its success or failure. Therefore, they must hold each other
accountable for implementing the development goals by living up to an agreed-
upon benchmark - much in the way that the EU imposed strict performance
conditions in the 1990s for European countries wishing to join it. We will now
examine foreign aid, its management and associated relationships, and draw
some lessons from the discussion.
2.5.2 The Nature and Limited Efficiency of Foreign Aid Allocations
Foreign aid is defined as "a transfer of concessional resources from one
government to another or from a government to an international aid agency or
a non-governmental organization (NGO) (which, in turn, transfers those
resources to poor countries)" (Lancaster, 1999: 36). As already mentioned,
development aid is used synonymously with Official Development Assistance
(ODA) and broadly follows the official definition established by the
Development Assistance Committee (DACf This committee was established
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
(sometimes referred to as the "rich men's club" because of its membership,
which comprises most industrialized countries in the world) as an outcome of
the 1961 Resolution on the Common Aid Effort. The DAC defined foreign aid
as:
3 The member countries ofDAC are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.
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Those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions
provided by official agencies that meet the following test: 'it is
administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare
of the developing countries as its main objectives, and it is concessional
(that is, low interest rate and/or longer pay back period) in character and
contains a grant element of at least 25 percent' (OECD, 1993:11).
ODA excludes private transfers of concessional resources (for instance,
private contribution to NGOs for relief or development work abroad), military
aid, credits for the promotion of a donor country's export, international bribes,
political development programs, tributes or funding for covert action against
another government or foreign organization (Lancaster, 1999: 36-37).
Since the success of the Marshall Plan in promoting the economic recovery of
Western Europe after the Second World War, economic aid has been
regarded as an important means of assisting the economic development of
poor countries. Development should be "the war against global poverty,
starting from the recognition that it is an investment not only in the
development of poor nations but also in the security of rich nations" (UNDP,
1993).
As discussed earlier in this chapter, aid had gone to Africa not only for
assorted reasons but also with conditions often specifically stipulated by the
donors. For instance, focusing on their national interests, donor governments
sometimes use aid allocations to develop or maintain their spheres of
influence, political or military alliances, or to promote their own exports
(Maizels & Nissanke, 1984: 879). According to a recent World Bank
publication, "Donors use aid to advance their values, their commercial
interests, their cultural aspirations and their diplomatic and political objectives"
(World Bank, 2000: 152). In the same way, many economists insist that the
tying of aid reduces its value, thus effectively raising the real interest rate
(Bean, 1994: 50). But the donor countries (for instance, Canada) have in the
late-1990s expressed their willingness to untie aid. This would serve as a
measure of commitment to aid effectiveness, value for money, and sustainable
development in developing countries. With the acceptance of a
comprehensive development model - and all that this entails - tying practices
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are seen as being incompatible with the promotion of effective development
partnership, local ownership, and capacity building strategies. Members of the
GECD's DAC have agreed that untying aid procurement would constitute an
important step towards implementing the development partnership strategy
"Shaping the 21 st Century" (CIDA, 2002: 33).
Developing countries have long argued that 'aid tying' is inefficient because it
limits choice and reduces their ability to make their own decisions on how to
allocate the resources available to them, including resources provided by the
donor countries (CIDA, 2002: 33). It is also widely agreed that tied aid
fundamentally undermines the principle of local ownership and stands in the
way of improved donor coordination as well. A 1991 GECD study "The tying of
Aid", prepared by Catrinus Jepma, provides another evidence that tying
reduces the value of aid and encourages dependency and wasteful spending.
The study also found that direct excess costs of tied aid have been estimated
to range between 15 to 30 percent. This means that developing countries pay
on average 15 to 30 percent more for goods and services procured under tied
requirements than they would if they were not bound by tied-aid policies and
could buy from comparable low-cost suppliers (Jepma, 1991: 36).
Furthermore, some studies have shown that 'aid tying' undermines aid
effectiveness and biases aid away from poverty reduction and sustainable
development by supporting commercial interests in donor countries, to the
detriment or exclusion of commercial participation and procurement in
developing countries (CIDA, 2002: 34).
2.5.2.1 Bilateral Aid
Bilateral aid refers to assistance provided by one country to another. Usually,
the specific detail of the arrangement is between the donor and recipient. Not
surprisingly, this often results in the donor having direct control (donor-driven)
on the manner in which the aid is both provided and utilized (Bean, 1994: 54).
The motives for providing aid vary not only among countries but also within
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one country over time. Quite often, the most important motive is the donor's
national interest. Donors support countries with which they have, or intend to
have, strong ties. These ties may be cultural, economic, political, or strategic
(Cassen, 1994: 205).
Different agencies within the donor government typically represent these
various interests. For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs focuses on
political and security objectives; the Ministry of Trade concerns itself with
commercial objectives; and at times, the offices of Prime Ministers and
President may have varied interests including economic, cultural security, and
political goals (Lancaster, 1999: 74). Often, the objectives or motivations of
the donors may be either transparent or can be gleaned from the patterns of
published aid disbursements. Sometimes donors expect straightforward
economic benefits - more bilateral trade access to agricultural or mineral
resources - a practice known as tied aid. In a newer form of tied aid, the
donor offers aid as subsidized credit for the purchase of its exports. Donor
governments then justify aid budgets by arguing that they promote their
commercial objectives and exports. The tying of funds may have hidden costs
for the recipient. The Development Cooperation 1994 report, put out by the
GECD's Development Assistance Committee, cites the following:
~ The aid may be given with the best interests of the donor in mind, not
those of the recipient country.
~ The subsidy involved in concessional aid may benefit the exporter
rather than the recipient.
~ Linkages between the development projects and the local economies
are not formed. Thus, the local economy may derive little long-term
benefit from the projects (GECD, 1995: 28-29).
Whatever the motivation of the donor, foreign assistance will probably
influence the development process of the recipient.
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2.5.2.2 Multilateral Aid
The multilateral aid system can be divided into a fully global system (United
Nations system), a regional aid system including the regional development
banks in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and multilateral aid programs of the
European Union that is directed by the commission in Brussels, which are in
addition to the national 'bilateral' aid programs of individual EU member
countries. There are also other multilateral institutions such as OPEC Special
Fund, Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), and a host of
others (Raffer & Singer, 1996: 41).
All donors channel a portion of their official assistance through intermediary
international agencies that allocate this collective aid to the needy countries.
This is multilateral aid, and the largest player in this system is the World Bank
(Hoy, 1999: 53-58). By the end of the 1960s, there was increasing pressure
on Northern countries to distribute their aid multilaterally rather than bilaterally.
At the beginning of the 1970s, only 10% of all Official Development Assistance
(ODA) was allocated to multilateral institutions. By 1985, however, multilateral
aid constituted roughly 30% of all aid (Raffer & Singer, 1996: 40). There was
strong support for the multilateral system despite severe criticisms. Critics of
bilateral aid claimed that duplication and confusion are virtually inevitable
when, for example, fifteen donor countries spend separate aid packages with
varying demands and objectives to a single redpient government. For
instance, in Kenya, different aid workers from various bilateral programs
created infrastructural confusion while attempting to assist with that country's
water supply difficulties. They ended up providing the country with eighteen
different makes of water pumps (1996: 15).
There is also an argument in favor of multilateral aid since no single
government has control over the disbursement of such aid. This makes it less
political than bilateral aid. Equally, the potential advantages of multilateral aid
compared to bilateral aid are enormous. Multilateral organizations often have
34
more knowledge and experience in their particular field than individual donor
countries. The World Bank has stressed that its lending decisions are based
solely on economic considerations and are not influenced by the politics of
either recipient or donor countries (Hoy, 1999: 44). Indeed, the Reagan
administration disliked the World Bank for the simple reason that the bank did
not adequately reflect U.S foreign policy interests. This obviously gives some
credence to the bank's argument. The U.S congress sometimes opposes
allocations for multilateral institutions because they believe that funds are
made available to countries that actively oppose the United States or that have
socialist, state-controlled economic systems (1999: 55). Some analysts have
argued that multilateral institutions "can establish systems of international
competitive bidding to purchase goods and services at the lowest possible cost
and maximize the real value of aid flows" (O'Neill, 1997: 34). However,
despite the advantages accorded to multilateral aid, the donor countries that
are the major contributors to the fund influence sizeable amount of the aid
allocations.
The central functional specialty of the multilateral financial aid organizations
(IMF, IBRD) is promoting and supporting the economic reforms necessary for
creating a policy environment that is conducive to economic growth. Those
activities include opening trade regimes, minimizing restrictions on the private
sector, and building economic infrastructure (Melior & Masters, 1991: 360).
During the 1990s, the World Bank added political reorms (protection of
property and human rights, maintaining the rule of law, enforcing contracts) as
a prerequisite for extending their loans. Unfortunately, many of the potential
advantages of multilateral aid are lost in practice as a result of poor
cooperation, lack of coherence, misplaced priorities, and bad management.
2.5.3 Foreign Aid: The General Assembly Target
The quantity or type of the development assistance affects the usefulness of
aid in promoting economic and social development. The amount of foreign aid
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given to developing countries worldwide, and Africa in particular, is small
compared to the size of the economies. June O'Neill (1997: 47) has argued
that more aid is not always more effective. She maintains that too much
foreign aid given to one recipient might overwhelm its ability to use the aid
effectively and productively. Yet, even a small quantity of aid can be useful in
achieving results, depending on its purpose and how it is spent (O'Neil, 1997:
47). In order to encourage the inflows of aid from the developed countries to
the developing countries, the United Nations has established a target for the
donor countries, which they are expected to reach. In the official aid statistics,
ODA is expressed as a percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP) of
each donor country.
In 1970, the General Assembly adopted a Strategy for the Second UN
Development Decade, which stated: "Each economically advanced country will
progressively increase its official development assistance to the developing
countries and will exert its best efforts to reach a minimum net amount of 0.7%
by the middle of the decade" (Hancock, 1989: 44). Furthermore, the Assembly
resolved in 1980 that:
A rapid and substantial increase will be made in official development
assistance by all developed countries, with a view of reaching and,
where possible, surpassing the agreed international target of 0.7% of
the GNP of developed countries. To this end, developed countries,
which have not yet reached the target, should exert their best efforts to
reach it by 1985, and in any case not later than the second half of the
decade (OEeD, 1985: 68).
Alesina and Dollar (1998) find that each of the five principal donors appears to
follow different directions. The United States targets one-fourth of its aid to the
Arab Republic of Egypt and Israel, strategically important partners in the
Middle East, whereas France and United Kingdom (as discussed in the
preceding sections) allocate most of their aid budgets to their former colonies.
Japan's aid is largely directed to other Asian countries, and Germany evidently
targets the economies of Central and Eastern Europe, mirroring its own
commercial interests. Alesina and Dollar suggest that the motives that donors
followed in the past in allocating aid were mainly strategic. They equally found
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that political, historical, and strategic connections play a bigger role in
screening countries for aid than economic needs or performance (Alesina &
Dollar, 1998:13-15). Warren Nyamugasira (2000) has argued that
Aid has failed to produce self-reliance or equitable growth mainly
because there has been too little effective aid, often coming too late.
Against the scale of needs, net aid, now and in the unforeseen future, is
rather small for most countries with many poor people, creating 'aid
under-dose' that seriously weakens the recipients' capacity to survive
and be creative. Recipients still look to the outside for answers: for food
and ideas, for technology and used clothing, for toys and fertilizers,
which come in sufficient quantities to keep recipients expecting more
but never in enough quantities and quality to make them independent
(Nyamugasira, 2000: 4).
Despite the resolution reached by the UN General Assembly urging the
OECD-member countries to increase their aid contributions to a minimum of
0.7 percent, only very few countries have managed to reach the agreed target
- as table 4.3 below shows from the recent figures in 2001. In the 2001 data,
fourteen of the 22 member countries of the DAC reported a rise in ODA in real
terms, and the average effort of DAC countries remained at 0.40 percent.
Denmark with 1.03% of ODA/GNI, Luxembourg with 0.82%, Netherlands with
0.82%, Norway with 0.83%, and Sweden with 0.81%, France maintained
0.32%, Canada with 0.22%, Germany and United Kingdom contributed 0.27%
and 0.32% respectively, while United States is at the bottom with 0.11 %.
Although the U.S. is the lowest on the table in terms of the percentage
ODA/GNI contributions, it remains the highest contributor in aggregate terms.
Jagdish Bhagwati (1985: 195) argued that official aid target is meaningless
unless there is 'subsidiary' targets' concerning the share of grants and the
terms and conditions on the loan. He believes that if the purpose of aid
programs is to transfer resources to the LDCs, it is better done through grants,
which removes the central problem of aid programs - debts.
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TABLE 1: NET OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FLOWS FROM
DAC COUNTRIES (2000-2001).
2001 2000
DAC ODAlGNI ODAlGNI ODAlGNI ODAlGNI % change 2000 to
2001 in real terms
countries US$m (current) % US$m %
(current)
Australia 873 0.25 987 0.27 -4.0
Austria 533 0.29 423 0.23 27.3
Belgium 867 0.37 820 0.36 6.9
Canada 1 533 0.22 1 744 0.25 -9.4
Denmark 1634 1.03 1 664 1.06 -1.6
Finland 389 0.32 371 0.31 5.7
France 4198 0.32 4105 0.32 3.6
Germany 4990 0.27 5030 0.27 0.8
Greece 202 0.17 226 0.20 -10.0
Ireland 287 0.33 235 0.30 20.4
Italy 1627 0.15 1 376 0.13 18.6
Japan 9847 0.23 13508 0.28 -16.6
Luxembourg 141 0.82 123 0.71 16.1
Netherlands 3172 0.82 3135 0.84 -0.5
New Zealand 112 0.25 113 0.26 -2.5
Norway 1346 0.83 1264 0.80 6.8
Portugal 268 0.25 271 0.26 -0.2.5
Spain 1737 0.30 1 195 0.22 43.9
Sweden 1666 0.81 1 799 0.80 2.4
Switzerland 908 0.34 890 0.34 0.1
United Kingdom 4579 0.32 4501 0.32 4.4
United States 11429 0.11 9955 0.10 12.4
TOTAL DAC 52336 0.22 53734 0.22 0.5
Average 0.40
Country Effort
Source: OECD: Development Assistance Committee 2001 Report (OECD,
2002)
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2.5.4 Decline of Aid Flows
While the providers of Official Development Assistance have become more
selective, it has not translated into a significant increase in assistance to good
performing countries - instead, aid flows have fallen for almost all African
countries. In 1999, the net official development assistance to Sub-Saharan
Africa dropped by $1 billion to $12.3 billion from the preceding year, and it was
well below the $18.1 billion received in 1994. Countries such as Ghana,
Mozambique, Uganda, and Tanzania that were acknowledged as making
determined efforts to improve their policies received less official aid in 19994 .
In March 2002, the EU and the U.S. pledged at the International Conference
on Financing for Development held in Monterrey to significantly increase their
development assistance over the next three years. While this was an




Despite the persistent decline in foreign aid flows to Africa, the majority of the
aid have not only failed to reach the countries most in need but also they have
failed to support the sectors most critical to the poorest populations in the
world. Despite the fact that majority of people in Africa depend on agriculture,
less than one-sixth of all aid resources support agriculture. Development aid
tends to favor the urban sector, where the poorest do not live.
Financial flows are increasingly being dominated by private capital flows to
developing countries. For instance, in 1996, private capital flows exceeded
US$240 billion, which equaled six times its level at the beginning of the
decade. In fact, the five-year period between 1991 and 1996, private capital
flows overtook and dwarfed the levels of Overseas Development Assistance
(ODA) (Stiglitz, 1997). Unfortunately, Africa has been largely by-passed by
these expanding private capital flows, a situation which has not helped to
4 http://www.usinfo.state.gov/regionallaf/a2041001.htm. Accessed August 2002.
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offset the impact of the global decline in the volume of ODA flows (ADS, 1997).
Prospects of future aid flows to Sub-Saharan Africa remain uncertain due to a
combination of factors such as budgetary pressures in many donor countries,
competing claims on donor resources, and changes in ranking of strategic and
economic interests especially following the end of the Cold War.
As aid donors and recipients continue adapting to the post-Cold War
environment, foreign aid remains embroiled in controversy throughout the
industrialized North as aid administrators, politicians, and the general public
debate the proper role of foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy. For
example, in the United States this debate resulted in deep cuts in aid transfers
to most developing countries. Despite the cut, the United States still remains
the largest donor (in aggregate) amongst the OECD member states. Some
industrialized countries, such as the Scandinavians5, maintained their aid
programs in the early 1990s and up to 2001 but tend not only to subject them
to increased scrutiny but also have redirected some of the aid to achieve
tangible policy objectives (OECD, 2002).
It has been argued that development aid has not always been well used. It
has sometimes propped up corrupt governments and been wasted on bad
projects (Hancock, 1989: 192; Lancaster, 1999). Yet despite its negative
press, official development assistance (ODA) has played a critical role in
supporting human development. It has played a vital role in financing access
to basic services. For instance, in Uganda, school enrolment rates increased
from 54 percent to 80 percent between 1996 and 1998 after education charges
were phased out (Oxfam, 2002: 20). This was as a result of innovations of the
sector reform program and the intemational donors. The Ugandan
government, in its efforts on poverty reduction through intervention developed
a strategy "Poverty Eradication Action Plan" in 1997, with key features that
includes programs aimed at improving Universal Primary Education. The
Poverty Eradication Action Plan emphasizes improved governance through
5 Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Luxembourg.
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enhanced transparency and accountability for resources directed to the
Poverty Action Fund (Devarajan et ai, 2001: 126). The lesson from the
Ugandan case is that it enforces the importance of ownership in any reform
effort. Where governments have strong national poverty-reduction strategies,
aid generates very large returns. The changing environment is epitomized by
the adoption of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) intended to
strengthen ownership and broaden civil society representation on public
spending priorities. However, there are serious problems with the PRSPs.
Consultations with civil society have been mixed and, in some cases,
governments', the IMF and the World Bank have adopted schedules that
preclude effective dialogue. Yet, the PRSP framework marks an important
step in the right direction. Important benefits are emerging despite patchy
performance. For example, in Ghana the influence of civil society through the
PRSP process has helped to focus attention on the more deprived areas in the
North of the country; and in Ethiopia the process set out strategies for
improvements in primary education, notably by reducing gender-based
inequalities (Oxfam, 2002: 20). In the past, the effectiveness of aid has been
compromised by bad policies, both of donors and some corrupt African
governments. Obviously, reforms are needed on the part of Northern and
African governments if real progress is to be made.
2.5.5 Donor-Recipient Aid Relationships
Despite much donor rhetoric on the need for aid recipients to own
development programs and the importance of building new forms of donor-
recipient partnerships, aid-supported programs are still basically donor-driven
(Helleiner, 2000: 19). According to Lester Pearson's Report titled "Partners in
Development", "Partnership between the rich countries and the poor, as the
latter struggle for development and poverty reduction, has been part of the
approved rhetoric in the development community for a long time" (Pearson,
1969).
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A critique of the Pearson Report in the 1970s, I. G. Patel correctly anticipated
the problems that would inevitably bedevil the aid relationship for a period of
thirty years from the time the report was released.
Unfortunately, the concept of a genuine partnership in development ...
lacks credibility. There has never been any real sense of equality
between donors and recipients even when they attend the same
consortium meetings and sit around the same table in many other
forums. For the recipient to be frank about the policies or attitudes of
donors in forum where aid is to be distributed is about as difficult as the
proverbial passage of the camel through the eye of a needle. Criticism
of donor policies, even when it comes from non-recipients, is seldom
answered in the manner in which recipients are obliged to answer the
most far-reaching criticism of their own policies. There are obviously
two sets of rules ... A mere equality of opportunity in engaging in
dialogue cannot establish parity in decision-making ... the doctrine of
mutuality in monitorship or genuine partnership in development is
impractical ... (Patel, 1971: 305).
By the mid-1990s, the donor-driven character of aid programs and the limited
local ownership that inevitably accompanied them had brought many analysts
and policymakers to the realization that a new kind of partnership between the
rich and the poor nations was required in aid relationships (Helliener, 2000:1).
Along this spectrum, the aid relationship between the donor community and
African countries has been debated on a shifting ground, as Adam and
O'Connell (1997) observe, from the "capital shortage" diagnosis in the 1960s
and 1970s, to the "policy failures" diagnosis in the 1980s, and finally to the
"institutional failures" diagnosis in the 1990s. Accordingly, the perceived role
of aid in Africa's economic development has also evolved: from that of filling
the emerging financial gaps by injecting donor resources; to insisting on
market-based economic reforms through privatization and de-regulation; and
finally to attending to institutional bottlenecks and political regimes (Nissanke,
2000: 6). Adam and O'Connell (1997) asserted that the failure of the African
state is the chief culprit for the donor's undue influence. Elbadawi and Ndulu
(1995) conclude, "SSA [sic] has been more severely impacted by adverse
external shocks but it has also failed to deliver a growth enhancing policy
environment - be it at the economic level or in terms of stable and effective
governance structure". Equally, Samuel Wangwe has noted that the
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effectiveness of foreign aid depends not only on policy environments but also
on a number of other conditions. The typical problems include weak
management capacity of recipients; poor aid coordination among donors,
which has led to the proliferation of parallel aid projects; lack of recipient
ownership of the development agenda; and problems associated with the
design of aid conditionality. Wangwe particularly emphasized that aid
programs are more successful when the recipient government not only has the
capacity to identify and articulate its own priorities and programs but also the
ability to implement, monitor, and evaluate the resulting programs. He noted
that low ownership of the development program is common across Africa since
the introduction of SAPs, in which aid has been donor-driven rather than being
a product of discussions, mutual agreement, and genuine commitment
(http://www.unu.edu/hq/academic/Pgarea4/Wangwe.html).
The ownership question acquired increased salience in discussions of
development problems and practices during the mid-1990s, not least in the
African context where successes with IMF-World Bank-driven 'structural
adjustment' programs and donor-driven projects seemed so scarce. A new
consensus emerged, which the World Bank itself summarized in a report on
aid effectiveness:
Typically, assistance programs that the recipient country perceives as
being imposed end in failure or have only a small development impact.
Government and beneficiaries do not feel they have a stake when they
have not contributed to the development of a program. Furthermore,
'home-grown' programs may be more effective in incorporating
institutional capacity, reflecting the needs of different domestic
constituencies, and addressing constraints (World Bank, 1995: 6).
According to the chairman of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee
(DAC):
If donors believe in local ownership and participation, [sic] they must
seek to use channels and methods of co-operation that do not
undermine those values. External support must avoid stifling or
attempting to substitute local initiative... The principles of self-reliance,
local ownership and participation, which underlie the partnership
approach, are inconsistent with the idea of conditions imposed by
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donors to coerce poor countries to do things they don't want to do in
order to obtain resources they need. That view of conditionality was
always of dubious value. Treating development cooperation as
partnership makes clear that it is obsolete (GECD, 1996a: 7).
Eveline Herfkens, Minister for Development Cooperation of the Netherlands,
in a discussion on "Policy Reform and Aid Effectiveness" in Africa emphasized
the importance of a "new aid relationship" that is based on shared values and
mutual appreciation of donors' and recipients' roles in making aid effective.
She stressed that the tendency of some donors to bypass key Ministries while
attempting to implement programs and projects in African countries created
conflicts rather than partnerships. She went further to state that the need for
cooperation between donor countries and recipient countries was imperative
for improving aid effectiveness6 . Quite often, donors impose projects on
African countries. Furthermore, recipient countries have had to contend with
large number of expatriates from donor countries as well as with different
agencies. The net result of an environment like that has been frequent
duplication of efforts. Herfkens concludes that improving the effectiveness of
aid in Africa would require shared responsibilities. Aid donors need to improve
ownership of aid-funded programs and projects by Africans and ensure that
aid is "demand-driven" and not "donor-driven". There is need for donors to
improve the reliability of aid flows and make them more responsible.
Paradoxically, despite these widely recognized research findings and
pronouncements from the highest bodies in the development arena towards
new forms of development partnership between aid donors and recipients,
there appears to be ever-increasing degrees of external interference into the
domestic political affairs and economic policymaking of African countries
(Helleiner, 2000: 2). Particularly sensitive in Africa was donor imposition and
failure of the 'technical assistance' which had been, by all standards, quite
ineffective in the creation and development of indigenous capacity (World
Bank, 1996). In this area also, agreements on impressive new principles for
"new orientations in technical cooperation" - emphasizing the need for long-
6 Herfkens, H. E. Eveline. www.uneca.org/ecaresources/MajorECAWebsites/jointlpanel.htm.
Accessed February 2003.
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term capacity building and for local control at all stages by the intended
beneficiaries had been achieved within the DAC of the DECD (DECD, 1995:
21 ).
Nissanke (2000) has argued that the appropriateness of economic policies and
political institutions cannot be assessed in isolation from the prevailing country
specific conditions. The policy failure has often been blamed on the African
governments and institutions in terms of poor policy environments and their
incapacity, but the donors should also take a fair share of responsibility for
imposing, in the name reforms, a series of restrictive conditionality that they
(donors) claim to be universally appropriate under any condition. Genuine
partnership in development would require not only the monitoring of aid-
recipient country performance but also the performance of aid-donor countries
and organizations by independent assessors drawn from around the world
(including the recipient state).
2.5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has provided a general overview of the problems associated with
the developmental effectiveness of foreign aid in Africa. The chapter has
equally shown that aid donors had the major say not only over which country
to give aid but also heM' the aid would be used. In light of all this and given
that donors have had so much influence over whom they have aided and how
their aid was used in Africa, it seems reasonable to ask: 'why has their aid not
been more effective?'
The lack of consensus on the details of development strategy has meant that
donors and recipients find it difficult to agree on how best to pursue
development. Although this was true in the past, there is a growing awareness
among members of the international community that if aid is to be more
effective in advancing development, there is a need to move toward a system
of development assistance that not only ensures country ownership of
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Economic development has been defined in various ways. The concept is
used by some to refer only to economic growth - the expansion in national
production and income. For some others, the concept includes the
achievement of an array of conditions, such as high levels of per capita
income, wide access to social services, political empowerment, human
security, and gender equality (Lancaster, 1999: 14). In this study, economic
development refers to a process of economic change that includes both growth
in national production and income and the improvement in the standard of
living of the poor.
Africa has continued to be the 'sick man' of the world. Current perspectives on
trends in Africa are gloomy, shaped by stark pictures of misery, starvation, and
death in many areas over the past twenty-five years. Other contributing
factors to the gloomy outlook towards Africa include: discouraging statistics on
overall economic performance; rampant civil conflicts resulting from social
disintegration and exclusion; growing numbers of refugees and intemally
displaced persons; rising poverty especially amongst women and children;
economic collapse and growing indebtedness; and threats of a creeping desert
as well as recurrent drought resulting partly from environmental degradation.
The net effect is a growing consensus that Africa is a continent in serious
trouble (Deng, 1998: 1-2). The above portrayal of Africa undoubtedly captures
many elements of the harsh reality of the region in recent years (Ghai, 2000:
1). In the 1980s and 1990s, Africa came close to being labeled by some
commentators as beyond repair and destined to sink ever deeper into the
infernal cycle of impoverishment, chaos, and violence (2000: 1). These
pessimistic prognoses led many to call for dramatic changes in then social,




[The] drive to undertake simultaneously economic and political reforms
has raised legitimate concerns within the African policy community.
Moreover, given the seemingly overloaded agenda of African
development, it is unlikely that meaningful economic growth could be
achieved at the turn of the century without a comprehensive policy
framework that would guide decision-makers and other stakeholders in
formulating appropriate strategies for economic development and social
progress in Africa (Deng, 1998: 5).
Much of the above pessimism stems from the failure of many African countries
to regain the momentum of economic growth lost in the worldwide recession of
the early 1980s. In the preceding 30 years, Sub-Saharan Africa had increased
its GDP by more than 3 percent per year on average. The recession brought
economic growth to a halt. Indeed, GDP fell by 17 percent from 1980-1985. In
1985, GDP increased by only 1.2 percent despite two years of recovery in
industrial market countries (World Bank, 1986c: 39-40). External public debt
grew rapidly through the 1970s and early 1980s, and by 1984 reached an
accumulated total equivalent to half of the GNP (Gross National Product) of
low-income Sub-Saharan nations. Service on this debt itself rose to almost 4
percent of GNP in 1984 and 14 percent of export earnings of these nations,
with even higher percentages reported in low-income African economies (ECA,
1986: 60; World Bank, 1986a: 214). At the same time, gross domestic
investment (GDI) and most industrial production stagnated (ECA, 1986: 18-
24).
Other indicators have been equally discouraging. The Sub-Saharan African
health, mortality and adult-literacy levels have deteriorated at comparable
rates. Life expectancy at birth now stands at 49 years, and 34 per cent of the
region's populations are classified as undernourished. African infant-mortality
rates were 107 per 1,000 live births in 1999, compared to 69 for South Asia,
and 32 for Latin America. Nearly 9 per cent of Sub-Saharan 15 to 49-year-
olds is living with HIV/AIDS - a figure that soars above those of other regions.
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Tuberculosis cases stand at 121 per 100,000 people; respective figures for
South Asia and Latin America are 98 and 45 (UNDP, 2001: 144, 165, 169).
3.2 Africa's Experience of Development
The disengagement of the British government from Ghana in 1957 was
generally regarded as the beginning of decolonization in sub-Saharan Africa.
Much of the rest of Africa gained independence by the mid 1960s. At that
time, one of the principal concerns for the majority of African governments on
the attainment of independence was the rapid fulfillment of economic
expectations. Independence was projected not merely as an end but as a
means towards attaining the good things of life that had been denied to the
people during the years of colonial rule. During this early post-independence
period, government leaders were poised to satisfy the rising expectations of
their citizens. In the process, they sought to protect and diversify state
economies and foreign trade patterns. They sought to educate and provide
employment for their citizens and to overcome the problems of development,
which could be a source of domestic instability in the future. The awareness
on the part of governments of the need to develop their economies led to
efforts to harness both international and domestic elements contributing to
development. Because of the external involvement in the development
process, development plans became fashionable for nearly all-African
countries and most produced programs, which contained exaggerated
expectations (Akinrinade and Barling, 1987: 8-14). In fact, in order to achieve
some of the stated objectives in the development plans, many African
countries would have had to depend not just on resources available
domestically but, substantially, on external contributions. This is because
underdevelopment, the principal characteristic of most African economies,
manifests itself not only in terms of material insufficiency and popular
dissatisfaction but also in the means to overcome them.
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Beginning from the late 1970s, an increasing number of African countries
began to experience economic stagnation or decline. The crisis acquired
increasing momentum in the 1980s"even as countries that had performed well
in the two preceding decades started to show signs of stress and strain. At the
end of the decade, there were few countries that were able to escape the
deepening social and economic distress (Ghai, 2000: 2). These declines were
seen as a sharp reversal of the social and economic achievements in most
countries in the post-World War 11 period.
The economic crisis was noticeable at all levels and in all areas. There was a
substantial decline in the industrial and agricultural production per capita.
Export earnings declined, as did the volume of imports. There was a big drop
in average consumption of goods and services. Public and private investment
fell precipitously. Real wages and salaries declined sharply for most
categories of workers. The rates of urban unemployment went up. The per
capita volume and quality of essential services such as health, education,
housing and water deteriorated in most countries. The physical infrastructure
of roads, electricity, communications and building suffered from disrepair and
poor maintenance (Ghai, 2000: 2).
Sub-Saharan Africa external debt rose to $227.2 billion in 1996 as against
$84.2 billion in 1980 while the region's total of disbursed public and publicly
guaranteed debt was estimated at over $169 billion by 1996. Total Debt
service as a percentage of GNP rose from 3.6 percent in 1980 to 5 percent in
1996 (World Bank, 1998: 240-244). Paradoxically, as the external debt and
the cost of servicing them increased, foreign aid began to decline.
Furthermore, the most heavily indebted poor countries at the beginning of the
twenty-first century have been obliged to restructure and reschedule their
external obligations repeatedly, not diminishing the outstanding debt but
seeing it increase while its composition harden around a growing multilateral
core. Yet, while the international community can mobilize about $100 billion to
bailout the middle and higher income countries of Asia - equivalent to about
half of the total outstanding debt of the 41 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
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(HIPC), no HIPC was cured of its debt problem in the 1990s. In late 1998, the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) joined
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), churches, and civil society in a global
consultative review, which led to an endorsement to cut external debt service
(World Bank, 2002: 331). In exchange for debt reduction, the beneficiary
governments would be required to implement sound policies and poverty
reduction strategies.
As mankind enters the third millennium, most African countries are still facing
the problem of choosing an appropriate strategy for development. After more
than forty years of independence, Africa's economic performance is still the
weakest amongst the developing regions of the world, and the constraints to
development are being increasingly felt. This was mainly because the
economic policies implemented in Africa produced conditions that could not be
sustained economically.
3.3 Development Strategies in Africa
The economic strategies adopted during the first decade of independence in
Africa considered industrialization to be the engine of economic growth and the
key to the transformation of traditional economies, essentially because of the
uncertainty over the outlook for commodity exports and the acknowledged
desire to reduce dependency on imported manufactured goods. African
policymakers also felt that governments should play a major role in
implementing these strategies. Consequently, and generally with the full
support of creditors, multiyear development plans were devised. Typically,
they involved investments in a vast array of basic industries with concomitant
implementation of an arsenal of price control regulations and exchange
allocations (McCarthy, 1994:123-125).
For some observers, the reasons for the weak economic performance of
African countries are linked to factors over which they have no control: bad
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weather, low world commodity prices, and insufficient aid flows. Others,
however, blamed the set of policies that were implemented, especially the
inadequate macroeconomic framework and the weakness of the economic
incentive structure (McCarthy, 1994: 124). Studies of this question have
analyzed in depth the reasons for the failure of development strategies in
Africa. These observers argued that the insufficiency in development
spending when compared with the needs of productive sectors such as
agriculture, industry, and mining was the major reason, and for the fact that
enough attention was not given to agriculture in particular. Also neglected
were measures to encourage small-scale producers to raise their productivity
and appropriately modemize their operations.
A close look backward in search of the African vision of development during
the early years after independence showed that such a vision was largely
reflected in the writings, statements, manifestos, programs, and actions of
some governments led by the first generation of African leaders that came to
power immediately after colonial rule (Deng, 1998: 12). A comparative study
of the literature showed that most of the African states were essentially, or at
least claimed to be, benevolent social guardians at the time of political
independence. But with the passage of time and change of leadership, a
majority of these states deviated from the path of social guardianship and
disintegrated into various forms of post-colonial statehoods including:
neocolonial, integral, prebendal, patrimonial, bureaucratic-authoritarian, and
revolutionary-socialist states (1998: 12). The net result of these regime types
was sodo-economic and political collapse in many countries. This, in turn,
necessitated a search for causal explanations and policy instruments that
would reverse the region's growing impoverishment and devastation. This
followed the neoclassical argument on the economic decline around Africa.
One of such causal explanations put forward by neoclassical economic
theorists ascribed the economic failure to the inappropriate policy choices of
post-independence regimes. The World Bank, in what some have referred to
as the "notorious" Berg Report, diagnosed the regional economic malaise and
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issued a sweeping injunction for reform (Lewis, 1996: 96; van de Walle, 2001:
210).
Peter Lewis (1996), writing in support of the report, argues that the observed
facts were uncontroversial: at the end of Africa's second post-independence
decade, most countries in the region experienced the stagnation or decline of
growth rates, the erosion of per capita incomes, de-industrialization, food
shortages, sluggish exports, chronic fiscal deficits, and mounting external debt
(1996, 96). The Berg Report attributed these problems to a common
syndrome of economic statism pursued by governments of diverse ideological
preferences. Statist policies, which combined to create debilitating economic
distortions included: excessive government intervention in domestic markets;
bloated and extravagant public sectors; protectionism and restrictive
investment regime; widespread bias against agriculture; overvalued exchange
rates; price controls; assorted subsidies; uncontrolled spending; and heedless
foreign borrowing. Cumbersome administrative regulations stifled trade and
investment. The neoclassical prescription for recovery was blunt: "get the
state out of the market and reintegrate African economies into the global
economy" (Young, 1982: 326; Lewis, 1996: 96).
Adebayo Adedeji (1995) argued that the economic stagnation in Africa is
attributed mainly to the legacy of colonial development and to Africa's position
as a subordinate and dependent region in the international division of labor.
The disarticulation of African economies and their reliance on primary
commodity exports while importing a broad variety of inputs and processed
products are adduced as central impediments to dynamic growth (Adedeji,
1995). This led to a dramatic decline in Africa's share of world exports,
especially commodities exports, and a rise in its volume of imports. The
decline of raw material prices in relation to the relatively constant prices of
imported manufactured goods escalated the deterioration in the terms of trade
(McCarthy, 1994: 124). This escalation was extremely difficult to control
because
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[a]ttempts to build a domestic industrial base in the poorer countries ran
up against the difficulty of competing with manufactured imports from
industrial countries, which benefited from economies of scale and from
years of accumulated industrial experience. There was only one
conclusion. A domestic manufacturing sector in the developing
countries could only be born and nurtured if they were protected against
competition from imports... Protection would be achieved by imposing
high import duties on imported manufactured goods or by restricting
what could be imported (McCarthy, 1994: 124-125).
The year 1985 must be taken as an important watershed between the old
approaches to modernization, development, and the new shift in focus from
state-directed development to neo-liberal free-market ideology. It must be
seen as the watershed in the legitimacy of the African post-colonial state and
the beginning of its collapse. In fact, this change in focus came about because
of the debt crisis, which was set in motion by Mexico's failure in 1982 to
service its debts. In that year, the deteriorating situation in many African
countries forced the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to seek an alternative
development plan. The implication was that the status-quo arrangements had
placed the continent in a dependency relationship with the developed world.
An alternative strategy contained in the Lagos Plan of Action put forward a
strategy based on self-reliance with the ultimate aim of creating an African
Economic Community by the year 2000 (ECA, 1989: 10). It was in response to
this plan that the World Bank came out with its series of reports such as
"Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa", sometimes referred to as
Berg Report, as mentioned earlier in this study.
The World Bank's 1979 Development Report had emphasized the engulfing
crisis on the African continent. The Berg report now blamed this state of
affairs on the slow growth of exports and criticized the poor policies which
African governments were accused of having pursued. In the meantime, the
crisis had intensified with the result that African states were forced to adopt an
emergency program called the African Priority Programme for Economic
Recovery, 1986-1990 (APPER). The program pointed out the weakness of
African economic development and tried to reassert some of the Lagos Plan of
Action objectives but because of the already weakened situation in the
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continent, it was difficult to pursue the self-reliance approach even if this would
have been possible under normal conditions. It was this new emergency
program, in a reformulated language, that was submitted to the United Nations
Special General Assembly for support in 1985. The accompanying paper to
the emergency program argued that there was no way African countries could
raise resources for the implementation of the crisis program given their
estimated annual debt-service obligation of $16.6 billion to $24.5 billion was
anticipated between 1986 and 1990. The paper argued: "if all the domestic
resources being mobilized to finance APPER are used in servicing the debt,
the African countries will still not be able to meet their debt obligations, let
alone have resources left to finance APPER" (Lewis, 1996: 96-97). This was
at a time when the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the
donor communities were implementing the "Washington Consensus" Structural
Adjustment Programmes, to embark on the liberalization and privatization of
the economies that the globalizing forces demanded.
In order to provide the African countries with a political rationalization of the
new demands to adjust, the World Bank published another policy paper in
1989 entitled "Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth", which sought to give
a more comprehensive theoretical and ideological backing to the changes.
This position challenged the earlier theories of political development by
advancing what Beckman (1992) called" a political theory of adjustment"
(Lewis, 1996: 97). This policy paper adopted a broader perspective to the
adjustment process by raising social, political, and cultural issues and seeking
ways to resolve the crisis.
Furthermore, political analysts came up with an alternative model for economic
decline. This perspective, takes its root primarily in the Weberian tradition of
historical sociology, which also draws upon recent theories of the state in
developing countries (Bayart, 1993: 19; Lewis, 1996: 98-99). From this
perspective, the central causes of economic degeneration are found in the
prevalence of weak authoritarian regimes in Africa and in the constellation of
patron-client relationships that underpinned the authority and rule of so many
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governments (Hyden, 1993; Callaghy, 1993: 573). Nicolas van de Walle
(1994) posits that the state-centric analyses highlights the dominance of neo-
patrimonial regimes throughout Sub-Saharan Africa because they reflect the
outward features of institutionalized administrative states while operating
essentially along patrimoniallines. Though rooted in historical patterns of
authority and social solidarity, neo-patrimonial rule emerged during the post-
independence era as African leaders consolidated their fledgling regimes
through an array of personal linkages and patron-client networks. Beneath the
veneer of formal bureaucracy, legal procedure, and constitutional order
inherited from the colonial state, neo-patrimonial states have been organized
on the basis of kinship, faction, and c1ientage. Power in such regimes are
concentrated and personalized, entailing discretionary control over broad
realms of public life. The personal prerogatives of the ruler typically eclipse
the authority of laws and organizations, fostering a weak and unstable
institutional arena (Lewis, 1996: 99).
By the end of 1980s, both the World Bank and United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa (UNECA) pointedly recognized the role of governance
in economic recovery, and they called for more responsible and participatory
government as a requisite for development (World Bank, 1989: 1; Hyden,
1993: 329; Lewis, 1996: 101). According to the World Bank (1994), the new
emphasis is on the restructuring of the African state in order to make it
supportive of its long-term strategy for the liberalization of the market forces
and entrepreneurial potentials of African society.
The adoption of Structural Adjustment Programs has reduced the area of
intervention by post-colonial governments seeking to promote the interests of
their people. This much can be said to have been the actual objective of
multilateral institutions, which have acted consistently to promote globalization
in Africa to the advantage of the dominant economic interests that control the
world economy. Although these adjustments have affected virtually all
countries in the developing world alike, it can be observed that unlike the
Western countries, the African post-colonial states have been made to adopt
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policies, which are openly against the interests of the vast majority of their
populations (the Mozambique's cashew nuts case study demonstrates this
claim - as will be seen in the subsequent chapter). The SAP policies are all
liberal economic policies. This has resulted apparently in the decreased role
of the government in the economy and the focus on free trade. Like their
colonial counterparts, the African post-colonial state elites continue to play the
role of post-colonial governor over their populations in the interest of
international financial capital and those of a small local group whose interests
coincide with those of the global financial oligarchy - who were soon called
"Big Men" (Lancaster, 1999: 27).
Big Men can provide their followers with access to the state's resources.
"Jobs for the boys" in the civil service, government boards and public
corporation can be furnished by legal illegal means. They can ...
channel low-interest loans and contracts from public agencies to their
friends and allies.... Some patrons will also supply their clients with
opportunities for illegal gain from public office; or, at least, they may
allow illicit practices to go unpunished for fear of losing support.
Corruption is one such opportunity - accepting or extorting bribes for
decisions or actions taken in public capacity. Others include theft of
public property, the illegal appropriation of public revenues (fraud) and
nepotism.... (Sandbrook, 1985: 94).
To this extent, democracy has been undermined and the whole nation-building
project has failed to be consolidated. African states, therefore, have failed to
mature into nation-states. Basically, they have remained at the level of
"imagined communities" (Anderson, 1991: 6). Globalization and the process of
SAPs have contributed to this weakness.
3.4 Development Challenges in Africa
The development challenges facing most African countries at the beginning of
the 21 sI century are complex and multidimensional - involving economic,
socio-cultural, political, and environmental factors that cannot be adequately
addressed through separate and isolated intervention. In human development,
socio-economic indicators have worsened, reflecting greater number of people
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in poverty and higher inequality than in other regions (ECA, 2001: 48).
Exacerbating the situation is high population growth rates, which combined
with low incomes, have lowered per capita income growth rates. The net
effect of which is high dependency ratios (World Bank, 2000b). Despite the
fact that almost all countries in Africa have embraced the neo-liberal policies
since the mid-1990s, the region has continued to wallow in crisis. Africa's links
with the global economy are still based primarily on the export of natural
resources. Its role in the international trading system is largely as a supplier of
commodities and valuable natural resources such as diamond, coltan, and oil.
The erosion in Africa's world trade between 1970 and 1993 represents a
staggering annual income of $68 billion, or one-fifth of the region's GDP.
Africa was unable to diversify into new areas of business due to poor policies,
geographic limitations to economic diversification and low investment,
especially in infrastructure. Shortcomings in governance deterred private
investments and Africa saw a massive capital flight and loss of skills to other
regions (especially the Western world). By 1990, almost 40 percent of private
wealth had left the region (World Bank, 2000).
Furthermore, many countries in Africa are heavily indebted. Foreign
indebtedness now poses a fatal impediment to Africa's development and the
future prospects for many countries are daunting. At the end of 1998, annual
debt service payments from Sub-Saharan Africa to the richest countries
amounted to $15.2 billion or 15% of exports while the total debt for that year
stood at $231 billion? The total debt has since increased to about $300 billion.
At the global level, there are calls for total cancellation of Africa's debts.
Though the current debt relief plans of the World Bank and IMF, Enhanced
HIPC Initiative is a modest advance, it has failed to resolve Africa's debt crisis,
as such a measure too little, too late, and too encumbered with conditionalities
(as in Mozambique's cashew nut case-study illustrated in chapter four).
The HIV/AIDS pandemic in particular poses a great threat to development in
Africa. The epidemic has erased many of the development gains of the past
7 http://www.iubilee2000uk.org/analysis/reports/africa.pdf
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generation (for example, life expectancy has been cut by 10 years in many
parts of Southern Africa) and threatens to undermine the rest. Twelve million
African children or more have been orphaned. Nearly 25 million Africans are
living with HIV/AIDS - far more then other regions - and the vast majority of
them are adults in the prime of their working and parenting lives. The tragedy
of the epidemic is compounded by the fact that it is preventable. But unless far
more aggressive action is taken across the continent, HIV/AIDS will continue
its rapid advance and progressively choke off other development efforts
(Oxfam, 2002: 16-19).
Finally, Africa has seen more than its share of conflicts. Poverty,
unemployment and low education feed into conflict and are more important
causes than Africa's ethnic diversity. Conflict has imposed large costs on
African countries - costs that can hardly be afforded - both in human and in
economic terms. Recent estimates suggest that conflict could reduce African
growth by as much as 1.5 percent of GDP per year
(http://siteresources.worldbank.orgIlDA/Resources/strategy/Paper.pdf).
In the past decade, many African countries have made important economic
reforms, improving macroeconomic management, liberalizing markets and
trade, and widening the space of private sector activity. Where reforms have
been sustained and underpinned by civil peace, they have raised incomes and
growth, and reduced poverty. Political participation has increased sharply,
paving the way for more accountable governments. The end of the Cold War
has changed the focus of assistance policies to performance. In that regard,
globalization and new technology offer huge performance potential for Africa.
Over the past decade, the net result has been an encouraging improvement in
performance (World Bank, 2000). To sustain this, positive growth will be
essential for poverty reduction. For instance, in order to prevent an increase
over the next 15 years in the number of Africa's absolute poor, an annual
growth of more than 5 percent will be required - nearly twice the level
achieved since 1973. And to achieve the International Development Goal of
halving severe poverty by 2015 will require average annual growth of more
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than 7 percent over the period, as well as a more equitable distribution of
income. Low incomes, high inequality and rapid population growth mean that
Africa needs a higher growth rate than other regions. Hurdles of achieving
these growth rates include an enormous savings gap, flagging investment
rates, and the de-capitalization of Africa's economies. Obviously, if Africa's
economies are going to grow rapidly and raise consumption at the same time,
an extended period of concessional financing will be needed (World Bank,
2000).
As the preceding sections in this chapter have shown, the agenda facing Africa
is large and complex. Solving these enormous problems is the primary
responsibility of all African countries. Good governance - which involves
sound leadership, improved state capacity and institutions, empowered
citizens, the rule of law, and increased transparency - will be essential to
provide the enabling framework to carry through on human and economic
development as well as forging new relationships with donors. Political
instability and conflict can destroy progress in building capacity and institutions
and can arrest development efforts. At the same time, weak governmental
capacity can lead to inadequate policy framework, poor use and impact of
development resources, and slower development. Fortunately, these issues
now seize Africa and its leaders and the most recent initiative in tackling them
is the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). While Africa must
take the prime responsibility and leadership for its own development, Africa's
partners must support this process, by providing funds, assisting in capacity
building, debt relief, conflict resolution, and improved access for African
countries to European and North American markets. In the light of the
discussions above, it is worth noting that no amount of aid from the developed
countries would have any significant impact in the continent if African leaders
are not committed to good governance, transparency, and accountability.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CASE STUDY: THE WORLD BANK
4.1 The World Bank
The World Bank was created at the end of World War 11 to fulfill the functions
considered crucial to world economic recovery and growth: full employment and
the re-establishment of order and stability in a post-war economy (Griesgraber &
Gunter, 1996:2). At a conference held in Bretton Woods, USA in 1944, a
consensus was reached that a World Bank should be set up to help provide funds
for the reconstruction of war-torn Europe. Later, this mandate was expanded to
encourage, primarily through its guarantees and long-term facility, project lending
to developing countries to help promote their economic growth. The main source
of development finance provided by the World Bank was supposed to come from
contributions and callable capital from member governments (rich industrialized
nations) and also from borrowing on international capital markets for on-lending to
poor nations. The Bank was thus expected to function as the intermediary and
machinery for recycling surplus resources between global capital markets and
underdeveloped countries. The World Bank eventually commenced operations in
June 1946. Ten years later, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) was set
up as part of the World Bank Group to lend to private borrowers looking to invest
in developing countries. In 1959, the International Development Association (lOA)
was created to provide 'soft loans' to poorer borrowers8. The World Bank and its
affiliate institutions - the IFe and lOA -- are known as the 'World Bank Group'.
They are administered from the same building - World Bank headquarters in
Washington, DC - and by the same staff. However, they are funded in entirely
different ways and attach very different terms to the loans that they make
(Hancock, 1989: 52). These institutions remain the three major components of
the World Bank Group.
8 Lancaster, C. (1999: 184-185). "Aid to Africa: So Much to Do So Little Done", with emphasis
added.
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The World Bank was created as an international non-state actor with its own
rights. Although much of its policies and programs are carried out by its own
group of professional staff, the Bank is often heavily influenced (captured or
controlled) by its most powerful members. For example, the United States'
government has considerable influence on lOA allocations to most developing
countries. In part, this is because the U. S. is the largest contributor to lOA
fund in real terms (as shown in table 2.4.2). Nevertheless, despite the outside
influence over its allocative decisions, the management is largely
professionalized and enjoys a considerable amount of policy and managerial
autonomy over most aspects of the organization's activities (Lancaster, 1999:
184).
This study has chosen the World Bank as a case study because it is regarded
as the premier aid agency in the world. Compared to other agencies, it has
the most comprehensive and accessible evaluation studies and summaries of
evaluations of its aid. Since many of the projects are assessed on the basis of
their economic rates of return, they can be compared across sectors and
countries over time. The Bank also produces studies of the effectiveness of its
interventions in particular countries and particular sectors. The various studies
are among the most forthright of any donor in their descriptions both of
successes and failures of Bank-financed projects and programs throughout the
world and they give us important insights into Bank programs such as the
causes of the problems surrounding the effectiveness of Bank aid in Africa.
Such valuable analyses are not usually available in the often less rigorous or
less informative evaluations of other aid agencies (World Bank, 1995: 28). In
this chapter, the Mozambique cashew nut production will be used as a case
study to illustrate how World Bank-imposed policies prevented the country
from resolving the problems related to the growing and processing of cashew
nuts.
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4.2 The World Bank Aid
Since its establishment, the World Bank has been involved in mobilizing
resources for financing development. However, the quality and quantity of its
lending, its resource mobilization capability, and its willingness to take risk
have all been found wanting in many countries (over the years). At the initial
stage, the Bank financed government-guaranteed development projects and
programs through sector and project loans; later, it began to shift to policy
lending predicated on an intricate set of conditionalities (Griesgraber & Gunter,
1996: 3-4).
The World Bank has two 'windows' through which it makes loans: the
traditional non-concessional window, and the concessional window of its
affiliate, the lOA (Griesgraber & Gunter, 1996: 3-4). Legally, they are separate
organizations, though in practice they share common staff, management
structure, policies, and rules. The World Bank's non-concessional loans are
given mainly to middle-income countries by using funds borrowed at
commercial rates in world capital markets. Most borrowers of non-
concessionalloans have annual per capita income levels well below $5,280
ceiling on eligibility. These loans are repayable over a 10-20-year period at
interest rates slightly higher than those the Bank pays to borrow funds
(Sanford, 2002: 743).
By contrast, the International Development Association (lOA) makes loans to
the world's poorest countries. Because of its lending terms and its exclusive
focus around the objective of poverty reduction, the lOA's assistance is more
suited to the needs of many poor African countries. It is often described as the
'soft-loan affiliate of the World Bank' because it provides interest-free finance
and also because repayments of principal - which do not begin until ten years
after signature of loan agreement - are spread relatively painlessly over
periods of up to fifty years (depending on the situation) (Hancock, 1989: 52;
Sanford, 2002: 743). The borrowing country pays a three-fourth of 1 percent
service charge to lOA; the World Bank uses that to cover lOA administrative
costs (Sanford, 2002: 743). All lOA loans qualify as Official Development
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Assistance because of its concessional terms. Most lOA borrowers have
annual per capita income levels below the $885 ceiling for eligibility (2002:
743). lOA loans are funded out of the money contributed by the multilateral aid
budgets of the World Bank member countries (mainly the big five - Britain,
United States, Japan, Germany, and France).
Presently, the United States contributes about 20 percent of lOA's new
resources (Sanford, 2002: 743). As soon as the lOA's uncommitted funds are
used up, the donors negotiate new plans (every three years) to replenish its
resources. The World Bank's member governments, under the lOA12
Replenishment recommendations by lOA Deputies, were required to provide
SOR 8.65 billion in order to enable the lOA to commit a total of about SOR
15.25 billion between 1999 and 2002. In principle, Africa's share of lOA
resources was projected at approximately 50 percent as long as the
performance of individual countries warrants it9 . Not surprisingly, the lOA is
the largest source of development finance for Africa. However, lOA
commitments to Africa have plummeted in recent years due to governance and
security issues found in some countries lO .
The Bank relies on a country programming process to make its lending
decisions. This process involves the development of an overall framework for
lending, called a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). This document (which is
drafted in consultation with the borrowing govemment but not a joint
document) includes priorities for Bank lending and the country's portfolio
performance. The Bank's country economic and sector work is also part of the
documentation that provides the basis for lending decisions. The staff of the
Bank often oversees its lending process, which involves both the identification
of projects and the implementation of project decisions. This has resulted in
the undermining of the borrowing countries' ownership of the projects (Warren
& Stokes, 1985: 18-19).
9 http://web.worldbank.orgIWBSITE/EXTERNALlEXTABOUTUS/IDNO. Assessed May 2003.
10 http://www.challengeglobalization.org/html/news notices/spring2001. Assessed April 2003.
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The World Bank made its first loan to an African country in 1950 when it
financed a road rehabilitation project in Ethiopia (Lancaster, 1999: 185). With
decolonization, more African countries joined the World Bank and began to
receive loans. By 1970, a total of thirty-six African countries had joined the
Bank and received at least one loan. By 1996, all African countries had
received loans from the institution (Lancaster, 1999: 185). IDA provides 10
percent to 20 percent of total aid flows to Africa. IDA12 period (2000-2002)
projected an increase in IDA commitments to Africa to $10.3 billion compared
to $7.6 billion during the IDA10 period and $6.6 billion during the IDA11 period.
This target was not met (as projected) by the end of IDA period (2000-2002).
The World Bank argued that the lower IDA lending commitments in Africa was
the net result of country specific factors such as the violent conflicts in Cote
d'lvoire, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the political crisis in Zimbabwe. An
additional factor contributing to the decline in commitments, according to the
World Bank report, is the continuing shift in sectoral composition away from
infrastructure and toward the social sectors, public sector management, and
institution building. This shift has the effect of lowering the average size of
loan allocations11. However, on the regional composition, Africa received the
largest level of IDA lending commitments. Its share of total lending was 47
percent, down from 50 percent in the preceding year (with Ethiopia receiving
SDR 363 million as the largest borrower). The report showed that the primary
reasons for the lag in IDA12 commitments were related to conditions found in
Africa, particularly the region's 'volatility' due to political instability, violent
conflicts, and poor governance issues.
Disbursements of the Bank funds on the regional level to Africa for the fiscal
year 2000 were lower at $1.8 billion from $2.1 billion in 1999. This was as a
result of 45 percent decline in disbursements from adjustment lending. Also
Political uncertainty (in Cote d'lvoire) and natural disaster (in Mozambique)
slowed down lending to some major borrowers. However, disbursements in
fiscal year 2002 reached $2.6 billion, compared to $2.2 billion in fiscal year
2001, and the $2.2 billion annual average for the five preceding years (World
11 http://www.worldbank.org/ida/progressreportida12.pdf. Assessed May 2003.
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Bank, 2002)12. Ethiopia had the highest level of disbursements in the African
region with $437 million. This is an increase from $270 million in fiscal year
2001. Other countries with substantial disbursements included Uganda with
$256 million, Ghana $204 million, Zambia $187 million, and Tanzania with
$170 million13. By and large, the amount of funds committed and disbursed to
Africa is far less than the size of the economies.
It should be noted that the one-fifth of Africa's total population that live in
countries affected by political instability are currently either cut off completely
from lOA assistance or receiving vastly reduced assistance because of political
instability. Therefore, a large number of Africa's people currently benefit little (if
at all) from lOA assistance. The World Bank also attributes the reduction in
lOA to each country's own performance record on which lOA allocations are
based. The good news for Africa is that those performance indicators, which
include progress on macroeconomic as well as social and governance
conditions, have been improving on the whole for the region despite wide
disparities among countries (World Bank, 2002)14.
In response to recent changes in the international development environment,
lOA seems to work more closely with borrowers and other development
partners. The World Bank claims that Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers
(PRSPs), prepared in a participatory manner by lOA countries, offer an
opportunity to align donor strategies more closely with country strategies.
Research carried out by the World Bank has shown that aid is most effective in
spurring growth and poverty reduction in countries that have a strong
commitment to reforms. The Bank further states that the lOA led all
development institutions in directing its assistance to countries that pursue
poverty-reducing policies. The lOA employs a performance-based allocation
system to channel its resources to countries that are undertaking reforms.
Through targeted allocations, effective leveraging of resources, and country-
based strategies, the World Bank claims that the lOA is helping the poorest
12 World Bank Annual Report (2002). http://www.worldbank.org/annualreport12002/chap0502.htm
13 hUp:llwww.worldbank.org/ida/progressreportida12.pdf. Assessed May 2003
14 World Bank Annual Report (2002). http://www.worldbank.org!annualreportl2002/chap0502.htm
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countries to participate in the global economy while also promoting equity and
inclusive growth for their poorest citizens (World Bank, 2002).
The performances of both the lOA and the World Bank have been frequently
critiqued by NGOs and academics. These evaluators were concerned with the
Bank's 'Structural Adjustment' reform policies, which tied lending to some
conditionalities such as the privatization of state-owned enterprises, increasing
exports, removing subsidies and price controls for farmers, reducing
government spending on education and health, and devaluing currencies. At
the time of its establishment, there was no thought of the Bank ever getting
into policy conditionality as a basis for its lending programs and, indeed, this
was never the case for Western European countries which were the first
beneficiaries of the Bank's lending programs. They argued that structural
adjustment reforms have been planned with too little regard for the impact on
poor people and many have resulted in severe social hardships. The
structural adjustment programs and projects are often designed in Washington
or with a borrowing government's finance ministry without prior consultation
with the affected populations. Some Bank programs and projects have been
widely criticized for waste, environmental destruction, social dislocation, and
even corruption. The Bank has also been widely criticized (even by its own
staff) for the centralization of its activities. For instance, a survey carried out in
1995 on the issue of decentralization elicited this view: "The Bank's rigor,
thoroughness, professional expertise and ability to bring to bear global
experience are highly valued, but its unwillingness to adapt to the unique
conditions, needs and requirements of individual countries is seen as
inadequate" (Kapur et aI, 1997: 1148).
Furthermore, the Bank has been accused of undemocratic governance. The
voting power of the World Bank board is based on financial contributions rather
than on the principle of "one country one vote". The world's five richest
countries hold almost 40 percent of votes, of which the United States share is
17 percent. This imbalance of voting power steers the Bank toward the
interests of the industrial countries. Yet, the Bank has little leverage over the
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policies of those industrialized countries, which often do not practice what they
preach through the Bank about fiscal, monetary, trade, or adjustment policies.
Furthermore, some countries have used IDA funds to help pay back their loans
to the World Bank. Such debt repayments are sapping scarce resources away
from investments in health care, education, and other human development.
Although the bank introduced a modest debt reduction initiative - Highly
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) - for a limited number of countries, it has
failed to address adequately the root causes of indebtedness in poor countries
such as those found in Africa.
Finally, civil society organizations in both industrial and developing countries
have exerted considerable pressure on the World Bank, directly and through
their own governments, to address these issues. In response, the Bank has
initiated some reforms, especially under the current president, James
Wolfensohn. For example, the Bank has adopted a plan to increase popular
participation in projects and policies; increased lending for health, education,
and population; and initiated a joint bank-NGO review of the social and
economic impact of structural adjustment. However, changes in practice have
lagged behind changes in rhetoric and in policy (Bread of the World, 1997).
4.3 Reorienting the World Bank
During the 1990s, the World Bank was characterized by changes in its
development policies. At an annual conference, James Wolfensohn (the
President of the World Bank Group), emphasized how far development
thinking has been altered by contrasting the 1990s with the present: "there is
very little talk about macroeconomic theory in the traditional sense"
(Wolfensohn, 1998: 59). In the same way, Ravi Kanbur (a former director of
the World Bank), acknowledged the 'complete flip around' during the 1990s in
the World Bank's approach to development (Kanbur & Vines, 2000: 95). The
World Bank seems to be succeeding in reorganizing itself as an institution with
a coherent outlook and a new sense of purpose. Even the Bank's erstwhile
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critics in non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have seen the Bank as quite
distinct from the IMF and also as a truly progressive organization (Pender.
2001: 405).
In its 'World Development Report 1999/200". the World Bank made an
unprecedented criticism of its own past policies. In contrast to previous
conclusion that Africa failed to grow because it did not implement World Bank
recommendations. the Bank now accepts that in important instances the
prescribed policies were adopted but failed. As the report states, "Some
countries followed the policies of liberalization, stabilization, and privatization
but failed to grow as expected" (World bank. 1999: 16). Joseph Stiglitz (1998:
9) also argues that, "Some countries have closely followed the dictates of the
model, but have not seen especially strong economic performance". James
Wolfensohn in conceding the failure of the development policies states that.
"we have learned that when we asked governments to take the painful steps to
put their economies in order we can create enormous tension" (Pender. 2001:
405). In sum, there is a clear rejection of the Bank's past approach to
development and a repeated commitment for the need for comprehensive
change. A World Bank study, "Aid and Reform in Africa". published in 2001
has revealed that economic reforms in Africa have largely failed because
donors have employed their instruments indiscriminately throughout the
continent regardless of the different prevailing circumstances. The report
synthesizes the findings of case studies of aid and reforms in 10 African
countries. Its contents reflect a shift in World Bank attitude towards policy
reforms in Africa from a donor-driven to domestic initiative (Achieng, 2002).
4.3.1 World Bank Policy Shift: The Comprehensive Development
Framework
By 1995, the economic policies that were promoted by the World Bank were
different in both nature and degree from the structural adjustment promulgated
in the 1981 Agenda For Action. The change did not consist of a redefinition of
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the macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization goals set out earlier; rather,
it embraced extended time frames to achieve those goals and the inclusion of
more targets, especially with respect to human investment and basic service
provision, poverty reduction and, more recently, good governance.
The structural adjustment programs, consisting mainly of macroeconomic
elements, were initially meant to run for three years. According to IMF and
World Bank proponents, the key ingredients of adjustment are reform and
restructuring based on new macro-economic policies such as a firm anti-
inflationary monetary policy, a sustainable fiscal strategy and a realistic
exchange rate, a market-friendly environment for growth, a liberal trade and
exchange regime that fosters international trade and investment, active social
policies (including well-targeted social safety net provisions), and good
governance. In addition, it sought to reduce external imbalance to levels
readily sustainable based on reasonable projections of soft official finance
(lOA) and, for less poor countries, prudent commercial borrowing (van de
Walle, 2001: 74-84). But the disappointing performance of structural
adjustment prescriptions resulted in wide outcries in many developing
countries.
The critics of the World Bank and IMF-SAP policies had argued that SAPs
were intended to extract as much debt repayment as possible so as to avoid
the equitable sharing of loan losses between creditors and borrowers and to
make those economies conform to a single economic model compatible with
the long term interests of a world economy dominated by rich industrialized
countries. There was criticism also regarding the impact of SAPs on the
environment and natural resources of the indebted countries and on
commodity prices as all nations competed to expand and restructure
simultaneously in a shrinking international market. Furthermore, there were
accusations that SAP strategies for recovery failed to take account of the
specific conditions of countries; problems related to competitive currency
devaluation resulting from the requirement to liberalize foreign currency;
reduction in the availability of resources for the realization of economic, social
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and cultural rights, weakening role of the State, and of the social
consequences of reducing state expenditure (Pender, 2001: 397).
The net effects of such criticisms and the objective reality of generally poor
state performances have been to set off significant changes in the World Bank
approach to conditionality. These shifts were in response both to external
criticism of SAP dictates as well as to internal ideological debates between the
proponents of sustainable development policies on the one hand and the
hardened economic reformists on the other. Ultimately, however, the real shift
came from the failure of economies which had already embraced SAPs,,
particularly the South-east Asian nations whose economic collapse in the mid
1990s showed the world that IMFlWorld Bank strategies were not foolproof
(Pender, 2001: 397).
Effectively, the Structural Adjustment Lending (SAL) and the policy of
conditionality that was attached to it have been terminated (Pender, 2001:
397). They have been replaced with what the World Bank called
Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF). The World Bank described it
as "an attempt to operationalize a holistic approach to development" (World
Bank, 1999/2000: 21). Launched by the Bank President on 21 January 1999,
the CDF's holistic approach has become the premise for subsequent World
Bank development policy. The World Bank stated that the CDF is anchored
not on conditionality, but on a relationship of partnership between itself as
"Knowledge Bank", and the borrowing government, having full 'ownership' of
policies it chooses to pursue (Pender, 2001: 397; Dante, 2002: 5). According
to the World Bank, the CDF is not a blue print but voluntary, and each country
must decide on, and own its priorities and programs: "Countries must be on
the driver's seat and set the course. They must determine goals and the
phasing, timing and sequencing of programs.... We must support and help
them to establish, own and implement the strategy" (World Bank, 2000: 9).
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4.4 Donors Influence on World Bank Aid
Unlike the bilateral aid programs that are characterized by the diplomatic and
other priorities of the donor states and little or no commitment to development,
the World Bank - theoretically - should not be subject to pressures to allocate
funds to poor performers for non-developmental purposes. Although some
analysts maintain that the Bank has not been compelled to lend to poor
performers in pursuit of non-developmental goals, it has often proved reluctant
to discontinue its lending to those poor performers. For instance, the Bank
continued lending to Zaire, under Mobutu's government, which was well known
for incompetence and corruption (Lancaster, 1999: 188). This could be the
result of pressures from its dominant shareholders such as the United States
for strategic and geopolitical reasons. Perhaps a good illustration of big power
influence on Bank policies is the sharp decline of lOA lending commitments
and disbursements to Zimbabwe in 2002-2003 due to what the donors labeled
the abuse of the human rights of its citizens. This is despite the fact that some
other countries such as Tanzania, Congo (Brazzaville), Madagascar, Haiti, and
Sudan were not being treated similarly in spite of severe human rights
problems.
Member states constrain the Bank through several avenues outside the board.
One involves periodic replenishment negotiations of lOA. As with government
agencies, periodic decisions on funding provide those making the decisions
with an opportunity to press for their favored policies. Member states have
sought to condition their contributions on a variety of policy changes. For
instance, the Japanese have demanded a larger share of voting rights to
accompany their increased contributions. The French have, it has been said,
demanded special arrangements for their clients in Africa. United States has
pressed for greater attention to the environment, closer collaboration with the
IMF, and controls on administrative expenditures by the Bank (Lancaster,
1999:197).
Like other aid agencies, the Bank itself has not remained passive during
negotiations involving its funding. It has lobbied for higher levels of lOA by
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pressing heads of state (usually from the borrowing governments) to urge the
heads of reluctant contributor governments to support large levels of funding.
For example, the Bank reported it persuaded President Julius Nyerere of
Tanzania to approach Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme to lobby other
leaders of developed countries on behalf of lOA in 1975. Also it was
successful in getting Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to urge British Prime
Minister Thatcher to support a generous lOA replenishment in 1982. Mrs.
Gandhi was so effective that Mrs. Thatcher subsequently lobbied other G-7
heads of government also to support a high lOA replenishment (Kapur et ai,
1997: 1148).
There is a wide consensus that new approaches to aid should be underpinned
by four key principles: selectivity in choosing aid recipients; designing activities
with participation of beneficiaries and implementing them in partnership with
other donors; strengthening capacity of recipients at all levels; and above all
restructuring aid delivery mechanisms to make recipients responsible for
development. The World Bank, in consultation with many lOA donors, has
emphasized the need for the Bank to expand its efforts, especially in the areas
of harmonizing lending procedures and focusing dialogue around PRSPs
(http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IOA/Resources/strategy/Paper.pdf). At the
annual plenary meeting, hosted by the United Nations Economic Commission
for Africa (ECA) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from January 16-17 2003, the
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi urged the donors to base all aid on the
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and channel most aid directly
through national budgets
(http://web.worldbank.orgIWBSITE/EXTERNALlNEWS). Ultimately, Africa has
remained the greatest single challenge for the intemational community in
general, and for the lOA in particular. That suggests not only that the lOA
should be prepared to continue providing the critical resources that Africa
needs but also to work together with all development partners to ensure a
more effective impact on the region.
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The study will now turn attention to the case of the Mozambique cashew nuts
industry as an example of questionable and counter-productive World Bank
advice. We will look closely at both the nature and impact of the Bank's "aid"
and advice on the cashew industry.
4.5 THE WORLD BANK AND MOZAMBIQUE'S CASHEW NUTS
PRODUCTION
4.5.1 Introduction
The collapse of Mozambique's cashew nut industry has become a cause
celebre for many critics of the globalization movement. The World Bank had
prevailed on Mozambique's government in the early 1990s to liberalize the
cashew sector and to remove restrictions on exports of raw cashew nuts. The
Bank hoped that resources would be allocated more efficiently and the
incomes of cashew farmers would be boosted. The policy was met with fierce
opposition from the domestic cashew-processing industry, which ironically had
just been privatized. After ten years of political strife, international controversy,
and ongoing reform, the consequences remain hotly contested. For its part,
the World Bank continued to defend its policy action while its opponents
blamed the institution for the closure of cashew factories and worsening the
suffering of the workers.
Historically, the cashew sector constituted a significant part of Mozambique's
economy, providing income to several million individuals across the country.
In the 1960s, Mozambique produced as much as half of the world total of
cashew nuts. Although the processing of cashew nuts began before the
1960s, much of the total production resulted from the activities of small-scale
producers. This changed over the ensuing decade with the entry into the
industry of bigger and more modem producers. By the 1970s, the country had
14 processing factories with a total processing capacity of approximately
150,000 tons of raw cashew nuts. Processing peaked in 1973 (as shown in
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figure 1 below) when 149,800 tons of cashews were processed for export.
Thereafter, however, the sector went into a long decline due to a combination
of adverse policies, civil war (1982-1992) and South Africa's policy of regional
'destabilization', and the World Bank's structural adjustment reforms. The
latter, which began in 1987, brought new tree planting to a halt. Following
Mozambique's independence in 1975, the government banned the export of
raw cashew nuts in order to re-invigorate domestic cashew processing and
add crucial value to its exports earnings. With that, Mozambique became the
first African country to process cashew nuts on an industrial scale. Quickly,
large mechanized factories replaced small manual-processing systems
(Deloitte & Touche, 1997: 2). Since then, the industry declined so dramatically
that Mozambique processed a total of only 8,000 tons of raw nuts in
1999/2000 (MacMillian et ai, 2002: 4).
Figure 1: Exports of Cashew Nuts in Mozambique (1961-1998)
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4.5.2 Cashew Nuts under World Bank Liberalization Policy
Following World Bank advice, the government loosened restrictions on raw
cashew production in the late 1980s when Mozambique undertook its first SAP
with the World Bank15 . According to the Bank, the program (the 1987-1990
Economic Rehabilitation Program -ERP) was aimed at decreasing overall
administrative controls in order to restore market incentives to promote
production and trade (Tarp, 1990: 183). In 1992, the Mozambican government
lifted the export ban on raw cashew nuts, freeing limited quantities of raw nuts
for export. However, a 60 percent tax on the difference between the freight on
board (FOB) and factory gate prices and a quantitative restriction of 10,000
tons were imposed (McMillian, 2002: 6). In 1993, the tax was lowered to 30
percent; the quantitative restriction was maintained at 10,000 tons. In 1994,
the export tax was maintained, but quantitative restriction was loosened. In
1995, the quantitative restriction was lifted and the export tax was reduced to
20 percent of the freight on board (FOB) value in 1995/96 and then to 14
percent in 1996/97 and 1997/98 (Deloitte and Touche, 1997; McMillian, 2002:
6). Faced with domestic opposition on the reductions of the export tax,
Mozambique's parliament passed a bill in 1999 that increased the tax to
between 18 and 22 percent, the exact amount to be determined each year,
depending on the market condition (McMillian, 2002: 6). Despite licensing
restriction and, later, a steep export tariff deterrent for the export of raw
cashew nuts, the Mozambican cashew processing industry was unable to
sustain either quality or quantity of output.
The World Bank liberalization policy was sharply criticized by the Mozambique
cashew processing industry. They argued that government had agreed to
protect factory owners if they rehabilitated or modernized their facilities.
Following the liberalization of cashew industry, Mozambique started exporting
raw cashew nuts to India - thereby depriving the local cashew nut processing
factories access to adequate supplies of the raw material. Not surprisingly, the
role of the World Bank in the cashew industry's dramatic decline in
15 Mozambique became a member of the Bretton Woods Institution in 1984.
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Mozambique has been controversial. The Bank's pressure for full liberalization
of the cashew sector left the Mozambican government straddled between the
local opposition (which demanded greater commitment to the protection of the
interests of the cashew processing industry including a protective export tariff
on raw cashew nuts) and the World Bank (which demanded total elimination of
the protective tariffs and other policies).
As Joaquim Chissano, the Mozambican President acknowledged in a
television interview,
It was Mozambique's poverty that forced the government to accept the
demand from the World Bank to liberalize the trade in cashew nuts. We
cannot say no. We had to measure the consequences. We had to
liberalize the export of raw cashews in order to obtain other benefits
from the Bretton Woods institutions. (AIM, June, 2003. electronic
version).
In Chissano's view, the cashew industry was sacrificed to ensure World Bank
and IMF backing for Mozambique's access to HIPC debt relief initiative.
However, he admitted that liberalization was 'prejudicial', and that
Mozambique would have rejected the World Bank dictate 'if the country had
been richer'. His government had adopted the controversial World Bank policy
framework, which was based on Hilmar Hilmarsson's 1995 report on
Mozambique's cashew industry. In the report, Hilmarsson had strongly
advised the adoption of a comprehensive liberalization strategy for the nation's
cashew industry.
4.5.3 The First World Bank Study
Given the importance of cashew and the significance of its decline, the World
Bank commissioned a study of the cashew industry by Hilmar Hilmarsson (a
World Bank consultant) in 1994, which was released in mid-1995. Based on
the comparison with other countries and technology employed, this report
concluded that Mozambique's industry, as structured in 1994, was so
inefficient that "the value of the processed kernels was less than the value of
77
the raw nuts had they been exported directly. Cashew processing is a losing
industry in Mozambique" (Hilmarsson, 1995: 2-4). The study further argued,
"Mozambique's smallholder producer has the distinction of being the poorest
paid producer in the world. The only option was to liberalize exports. "Some
factory employees will lose jobs ... but increased cashew production and
multiplier effects will more than make up for that" (Hilmarsson, 1995: 2-4;
Cramer, 1999: 1252). The report further argued,
~ that peasants earned only 20 percent of the world market price
compared to 50 percent in other cashew producing countries;
~ that only 1,500 people were working in the factories;
~ that the industry lost foreign exchange because the value of the
processed kemels was less than the value of the raw nuts had they
been exported directly because Mozambican factories produced only 43
percent of whole white kernels (demanded by the U.S. market)
compared to 70 percent for India (Hilmarsson, 1995: 4, 27, 34).
The Bank had hoped that there would be sufficient competition at the market
level to ensure that reducing export tax would increase the export price and,
therefore, the producer price. Although it managed to convince the
government that 'liberalization and privatization' were appropriate, they
disagreed on the extent and the timeframe for the effective activation of the
policy. Thus, while the Bank favored immediate and complete elimination of
the tax, the industry favored a gradual and partial reduction of the tax (World
Bank,2000a).
Following the release of the report, the processing industry rebutted the
claims, arguing that Hilmarsson not only knew very little about the industry but
also had failed to hold discussions with them. They maintained that all the
data used in the study were based on the worst possible year - the transition
year from state to private ownership - and took no account of the special costs
inherited by the new owners as a result of the damage from civil war that had
recently ended. They also maintained that many roads were closed or in bad
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condition, resulting in high transportation costs and irregular power supply
(Hanlon, 2000: 34).
Furthermore, the Cashew Industry Association (Aicaju, Associa<;80dos
Industrias de Caju) rebutted the Hilmarsson report, which claimed that
peasants earned only 20 percent of the world market price compared to 50
percent in other cashew producing countries. The industry claimed that the
1993/1994 producer price for cashew nuts was the lowest in a decade and
was 34 percent of the export price of raw nuts, but in the subsequent year it
moved up to 41 percent. Furthermore, they rejected claims by Hilmarsson's
report that only 1,500 people were working in the factories. Instead, they
insisted that in mid-1996 the workforce had increased to 8,867 and was close
to its normal level of 10,000 (Hanlon, 2000: 34).
Hilmarsson's claim that the industry lost foreign exchange because the value
of the processed kernels was less than the value of the raw nuts had they
been exported directly because Mozambican factories produced only 43
percent of whole white kernels (demanded by the U.S. market) compared to 70
percent for India (Hilmarsson, 1995: 34) was challenged by the cashew
industry, arguing that low productivity was because the factories had not been
modernized, and also cited the problem of raw cashew nuts being smaller in
Mozambique than India as a result of tree disease and age (Hanlon, 2000: 34).
Moreover, the Bank overlooked not only the unfair advantages held by India
(which had become the world leader in cashew production) but also that
India's cashew industry was heavily subsidized and depended more on
manual labor - notably of peasant children - to shell the nuts, a system that
was cheaper but exposes workers to the toxic fluid contained in cashew shells.
Beyond all that, the Cashew Industry Association also advanced several other
arguments including the following points:
~ The study had been done without talking to the people in the indusry,
and had fundamental flaws;
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~ Globalization had the effect of lowering health and safety standards at
the work place;
~ It was a myth that peasants would gain;
~ The Mozambican economy was in serious danger of becoming too
dependent on a single buyer of raw cashew nuts - India;
~ The study was carried out before privatization without telling potential
buyers, and was only published after privatization; and
~ Buyers of the newly privatized factory had been cheated because they
had an implicit (and in some cases explicit) promise that there would be
protection until they get the industry back on its feet (Hanlon, 2000: 35).
Despite strong criticisms of the Hilmarsson report from the Mozambican
government officials, the cashew industry, and the trade union calling for the
reconsideration of the policy, Hilmarsson's proposal was adopted as World
Bank policy in mid-1995 when the World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy
(CAS) Report required Mozambique to liberalize raw cashew marketing and
export to satisfy "base case" conditions and qualify for approximately US$ 400
million of loan assistance (World Bank, 1995a). According to Kekobad Patel,
head of the Mozambican Cashew Industry Association, "At the time
Mozambique needed over US$ 400 million in support from the World Bank for
our economy and the Bank would only release the funds if trade in cashews
was liberalized" (UN IRIN, 2002). This is in line with the IMFlWorld Bank's
SAPs in developing countries seeking financial assistance. However,
according to the World Bank's former Mozambique Country Director Phyllis
Pomerantz, there was no specific "conditionality" (McMillian, 2002: 5). Yet,
apparently following the direct intervention of the World Bank's president,
James Wolfensohn, in February 1997, the Bank announced its commitment to
a domestic processing industry. Wolfensohn was approached by angry
industrialists who claimed that the World Bank was responsible for the
problems the industry was having procuring raw cashew nuts. Wolfensohn
responded by authorizing another study on the cashew industry (McMillian et
ai, 2002: 7).
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4.5.4 The Second World Bank Study
In 1997, following the criticism from Mozambique's media and trade unions, an
independent study by an international consultancy firm (Deloitte & Touche)
was commissioned by the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Tourism and funded
by the World Bank, and was released in September 1997 (Deloitte & Touche,
1997). The study came out in favor of protecting the processing factories for
some period of time as argued by the Mozambican Cashew Industry
Association; it argued that Hilmarsson's study 'should be abandoned'. Also, it
argued that the net outcome of the implementation of the Hilmarsson report
would be the destruction of the Mozambique cashew processing industry. As
solution, the study proposed a 'fundamental change in policy' (Hanlon, 2000:
41). The new study raised several points:
~ Indian subsidies to its industries 'tilt the playing field' and make
competition unfair
~ 'Improved management practices continue to contribute to factory
efficiency' in the newly privatized Mozambican factories, with a steady
increase in the percentage of 'whole white' nuts. Mozambican workers
are as efficient as the Indian ones.
~ Mozambique eams an extra US$130 per tonne by processing its own
cashew kernels, in contrast to eamings from exporting raw nuts. This
extra earning 'alone is sufficient reason to support the processing
industry against competition from India'. The study called for an
increase in the raw cashew export tax.
~ Peasants did not gain any thing from liberalized exports; the traders
held all extra profits (Hanlon, 2000: 37; Fauvet, 2000: 15).
Joseph Hanlon, an opponent of World Bank policies, has criticized the Bank
for infringing on Mozambique's sovereignty and forcing it to accept policies
against its will (Hanlon: 2000: 42). Along the same line, Christopher Cramer
(1999: 1253) argues that the World Bank has (at times) appeared to falter in its
own approach. The Bank, he argued, not only advocated free market policies
on the basis of textbook microeconomic assumptions but also claimed that
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liberalization would stimulate an expansion in the processing industry, with
new firms entering the industry and a shift toward more labor-intensive
production leading to new employment opportunities (Cramer, 1999: 1253).
As it turns out, those claims may have been wishful thinking. Despite the
liberalization of the exports of raw cashew nuts, cashew production in
Mozambique has continued to be on the decline. Boaventura Mondlane, the
secretary general of Mozambique's Cashew Workers Union (SINTIC),
admitted that there is little chance that any of the large cashew processing
factories that were forced to close down in recent years will be able to re-open
in the foreseeable future (Mozambique File, 2003: 18). But why were free
market theorists and proponents of liberalization policies so wrong about the
cashew industry in Mozambique? In a New York Times editorial, Paul
Krugman (a free market proponent) criticized the opponents of the World
Bank's intervention in the Mozambique cashew industry, particularly Robert
Naiman of the Genter for Economic and Policy Research, for not fully
understanding the case. Krugman asserted that the rural peasant farmers,
who lack political power, were forced to bear the cost of the export, which
forced them to sell their crop cheaply to the domestic processing industry. The
export tax, according to Krugman, was a means of protecting the processing
industry and its relatively small number of politically influential factory owners
and workers. He concluded by saying that the export tax had a net negative
impact on Mozambique and that the World Bank was justified in making loans
conditional on reducing the export tax (Krugman, 2000: 23).
Krugman's criticisms were bolstered from other quarters. Paul Fauvet's
argument that farmers did not gain anything from liberalized export was
criticized by Graham Mann, arguing that reducing the tax on raw cashew
exports, as advocated by the World Bank, led to increases in farm-gate
(producer) prices between 1996 and 1999. Mann further asserts that the
producer benefits would have continued had the government fully implemented
the World Bank policy and completely eliminated the export tax. Mann
counters the opposition's claims that the factories failed because of an
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inadequate supply of high quality raw cashew nuts. He states: "more than half
of the factory owners who complain about not having nuts for their factories
were also exporting raw cashew nuts in all sorts of discounted arrangements
with India" (McMillian, 2002:31). Mann concluded that factories did not fail due
to inadequate supplies of raw cashew but because of poor business decisions.
An independent study by Margaret Mcmillian, Dani Rodrik & Karen Horn Welch
(2002) titled 'When Economic Reform Goes Wrong: Cashews in
Mozambique", concluded from an economic point of view that India has
effective "monopsony" power in the purchase of raw cashew nuts from
Mozambique. They also found that the market for processed cashew is more
competitive than the market for raw cashew. Thus moving from the export of
processed nuts to the export of raw nuts entails a term of trade loss for
Mozambique (McMillian et ai, 2002: 21). Ironically, the liberalization of the
export market in Mozambique may have actually increased India's bargaining
power. The countries exporting raw cashew to India do not collaborate with
each other in setting prices or quantities, and individually their market power
vis-a-vis India depends on the number of exporters per country (2002: 21).
For example, Mozambique's first exporter of raw cashew nuts to India was
competing with only three other exporters (Deloitte & Touche, 1997). As a
result of market liberalization, the number of exporters more than tripled in
number. This increase in competition at the export level - intended to benefit
farmers - reduces Mozambique's bargaining power vis-a-vis Indian importers
of raw cashew nuts16.
The continued reactions from the cashew processing industry on liberalization
policy of the World Bank led to the introduction of a bill in the Mozambican
Parliament in 1999, entitled: "Proposed Bill for the Cashew Sub-Sector
Reindustrialization in Mozambique". The bill proposed that the export of raw
cashew nuts be banned; that priority should be given to first supply the local
plants; and that market prices be set at the producer level (McMillian et al
16 Quenum & Associates. Economic analysis: True Causes behind the Collapse of Mozambique's
Cashew Nut Industry http://www.businessafrica.hispeed.com/africabiz/cashewmanagement.htm.
Assessed July 2003.
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2002: 31). In October 1999, the National Assembly passed a law providing for
an increase in the export tax on raw cashew nuts from 14 percent to 18-22
percent and for a first right to purchase raw nuts for the indigenous processors
(Fauvet, 2000: 15; IMF, 2001). However, despite the increase in the export
tax, there has been significant exit of firms from processing due to the problem
of obtaining sufficient raw material resulting from low smallholder production.
In January 2001, the Mozambican government placed a temporary embargo
on the export of raw cashew nuts to India (AIM, January, 2001). The
government action was in response to suspected massive under-invoicing by
exporters who blamed the low prices on the poor quality of the Mozambican
nuts, as per the assessment of the Indian buyers and the pre-shipment
inspection company (2001). Nevertheless, the net effect of this ban has been
two-pronged: increased unemployment for workers in the processing sector
and worsening poverty conditions for the disorganized, scattered, and mostly
poor and food insecure farmers all over the country.
4.6 Conclusion
Having considered the various arguments surrounding the collapse of
Mozambique cashew nut industry, it was discovered that the situation in the
cashew sector is multi-faceted. The debate shows that the World Bank may
not be singularly responsible for the collapse of Mozambique's cashew nut
industry. This is despite persistent claims by the cashew processing industry
that the liberalization of the trade in raw cashew nuts was the major cause of
the collapse. In one way or another, the Bank may have 'shot in the air the
goose' that is Mozambique's second largest foreign exchange provider to the
national budget. However, the World Bank's imposition of its reform program
on Mozambique (even when the people rejected the policy) may be a sign of
the Bank's insensitivity. Perhaps, President Chissano was correct when he
pointed that Mozambique "had to liberalize the export of raw cashews in order
to obtain other benefits from the Bretton Woods institutions" (AIM, June 25,
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2001). Specifically, Mozambique complied with the World Bank's liberalization
policy in order to qualify for HIPC debt relief. In essence, the cashew
processing industry was sacrificed for reduced debt. Responding during a
parliamentary debate to opposition complaints that the government was taking
orders from foreigners, the Prime Minister of Mozambique, Pacoal Manuel
Mocumbi, acknowledged: "We are a country that begs, and beggars have their
sovereignty curtailed" (Fauvet, 2000: 18). This has important implications for
International Financial Institution (IFI) reforms given that reluctant governments
are placed in positions where they are forced to trade external assistance for
their preferred policies. Clearly, the fact of compellance creates a context not
just of potential inertia or blackmail in implementing policy frameworks but also
of overall policy ineffectiveness or failure.
On the other hand, the Mozambican authorities may have been partly culpable
for the collapse of the cashew industry by opting to accept the World Bank's
(and IMF) recommendations to sell raw cashew nuts instead of processed
products. There is no evidence of meaningful assessment of the credibility or
viability of either the suggested policy framework or how to enhance it. The
government made little effort to manage the political fallout that should have
been quite predictable ex ante. According to Cramer (1999), the lack of
economic data and feedback between the then public companies in charge of
the cashew nut industry and the Mozambican authorities may have been fatal.
Nevertheless, whatever the reason for the failure of the Mozambican cashew
industry, it is obvious that without an increase in the supply of raw nuts, there
will be no vibrant processing industry in Mozambique. According to former
World Bank Country Director, Phyllis Pomerantz, the government of
Mozambique neglected the importance of farmer supply response. Pomerantz
argues that there is a communication gap between cashew nut farmers and
the government about the reforms in the cashew sector. She maintains that
the even if the government fully intended to make good on its promises, it
would have been of little use if the farmers were not informed about the shift in
pricing. The farmers were not only sidelined in designing the reform package
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but also were largely unaware of substantial reforms taking place (McMillian et
ai, 2002: 27).
Mozambique's cashew nuts case illustrates several themes now dominant in
analyzing development. Policy reforms that are imposed by the multilateral
lenders (for example, World Bank, IMF) are rarely conducive for desirable
outcomes in recipient countries, particularly in Africa. The credibility problems
that the Mozambique program encountered were created partly because the
government's cashew sector liberalization policy was viewed as a World Bank
policy - something the government was doing to qualify for World Bank (and
IMF) loans. Because the Mozambican government did not have full
"ownership" of the reform program, the government found itself in a poor
position to sell the program to a public that is already skeptical.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS: WAY TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
This study is neither exhaustive nor does it provide all the solutions. It seeks
merely to stimulate further the on-going debate on the role of foreign aid in the
economic development of Africa, to inform initiatives that look more closely at
Africa's problems and possible solutions and, finally, to make some
suggestions on how aid can contribute to Africa's transformative goals. The
study has reflected on why African countries have not created conditions
sufficient for sustained socio-economic development, and why external support
has not reinforced a coherent agenda for long-term development. It has also
attempted to outline the agenda and conditions necessary to make progress in
these two directions. The study focused on the issues surrounding the
concept of ownership of aid programs and projects by Africans as against the
usual donor-driven arrangements that have engulfed the donor-recipient aid
relationships since the inception of development cooperation.
The gravity of the situation in Africa has attracted greater attention in recent
years. This has led to controversies and views within and outside Africa as to
the exact nature of the measures needed to deal with the African crises.
However, there have been some positive signs. A broad and growing
consensus in policy analysis has emerged in recent years among both the
development institutions and researchers. This recognizes that long-term
development in Africa requires comprehensive approaches and policies that
go beyond adjustments as prescribed by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWls)
(Rasheed, 1996: 17). This broad consensus is reflected in major institutional
and inter-governmental policy documents such as the OECD's Economic
Cooperation 1997; the World Bank's "A Continent in Transition: Sub-Saharan
Africa in the mid-1990s"; and the ECA's Human Development Report in Africa,
1995.
One crucial aspect of that consensus is that African countries must take
charge of their own destinies. Recently, Africans and their development
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partners have proclaimed the desirability of this seemingly obvious objective.
The tricky issue is whether Africans, in reality, are able to take the initiative
seriously. This could happen if there is mutual interest and genuine desire by
both African governments and their development partners to achieve this goal.
While the Africans must be aggressive in their approach to this issue, success
will be a shared responsibility of the Africans on one side and their partners on
the other. A new ethic in international development cooperation with Africa
must emerge if Africa is to change its fortunes for the better.
Africans are increasingly holding their governments to account: they are
actively demanding change and greater inclusiveness. Local and regional
media are speaking openly and freely against enormous odds about highly
political issues. Local non-governmental organizations are pressing their
governments to fight HIV/AIDS and increase access to reproductive health.
Peace building and conflict resolution efforts at local levels across the
continent are increasing.
Most significantly, African governments have recognized the need for
concerted action and have demonstrated new political will to achieve this. In
July 2001, they transformed the OAU and created an ambitious new structure,
the African Union (AU), with a view to reinvigorating collective action across
the continent. The AU has approved a key initiative by African leaders, the
"New Partnership for African Development" (NEPAD). It argues that Africa's
future is in its own hands, and called for a new relationship between Africa and
the international community based on a commitment to good governance,
democracy, and human rights. At the same time, African leaders will endeavor
to prevent and resolve conflict and instability, thereby creating and nurturing
conditions conducive for investment, growth, and development. The NEPAD
documents recognize that Africa cannot be understood without an
understanding of the legacy of the continent's history and its interaction with
the rest of the world (Oxfam, 2002: 24).
At the global level there appears to be greater willingness to help address the
crisis in Africa. It is still unclear whether this will lead to the dramatic change in
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political will that is required. The NEPAD initiative has been well received by
the main development players in Africa, including the G8, the European Union,
the UN, and the World Bank. International donors appear to be in agreement
about Africa's unique problems and the need for special arrangements in a
range of development areas. They applaud African governments for taking
ownership and responsibility for the development process, and promise to
support them in doing so.
More recently, this broad consensus received renewed attention and more
forceful articulation in the main document of the New Partnership for Africa's
Development (NEPAD), which seeks primarily to eradicate poverty, to put
Africa on a path to sustainable development, to address persistent
underdevelopment throughout the continent, and to ensure that Africa is
accepted as an integral part of the globalizing world. This broad consensus
also recognizes that only Africans can reverse the continent's socio-economic
retrogression and that economic and political changes require enhanced and
sustained levels, and better coordinated patterns, of external support
(http://www.hsrc.ac.za/gis/papers/AfricanRenaissance/policyFramework.html).
In this study, it was argued that African countries must assume primary
responsibility for, and take charge of, their development destiny. Africa's
bilateral and multilateral partners have often proclaimed the desirability that
African countries take ownership of reform programs, mobilize domestic
resources and establish sectoral investment priorities. While all these are
laudable goals, the issue is broader and more complex than it appears on the
surface. It is of crucial importance to note that there are two aspects that need
to be recognized in this regard: first, the overall context and objectives of
desired development initiative, and second, whether African countries are
actually able to take the initiative in charting their own development paths.
Past attempts by African leaders to implement such programs failed due to
their failure or inability to take ownership of the process. Now, a new set of
circumstances including widespread democratization of African states and the
influence of globalization are at work and may provide more propitious context
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within which the new initiative (NEPAD) can succeed. Amongst other things,
the success of the initiative may entail that African leaders will drive the
process as part of a consultative and participative process involving all African
nations as well as the people of the continent.
While the international partners have contributed to the declarations and
compacts in line with the emerging consensus on long-term development
objectives in Africa, conditionalities have largely been framed around
economic reform programs. Aid relationships have been difficult to change in
low-income countries such as many of those in Africa. Despite much donor
rhetoric on the need for recipient ownership of development programs and the
building of donor-recipient partnerships, aid-supported programs are still
basically donor-driven. The continuing imbalance in aid relationships is
manifest in many ways. An important and previously neglected dimension of
the problem is the imbalance in performance monitoring as between donors
and recipients. Whereas the behavior and performance of African countries is
measured and assessed in ever-increasing detail within the intemational
community, the behavior and performance of their donor partners receives
only cursory attention, except at an aggregate level that is of little operational
usefulness to individual recipients. When it comes to performance monitoring,
as in so many other spheres, the powerful (the donors and the WBls) still call
all the shots (Helleiner, 2000: 24-26).
Genuine partnership in development requires the monitoring, by independent
assessors, of individual and collective donor performance at the level of
individual aid-recipient developing countries (Helleiner, 2000: 19). The Heads
of State and Government Implementation Committee of the NEPAD adopted a
proposal in Abuja for an African mechanism in March 2002. This proposed
African Peer Review (APR) mechanism is expected to strengthen African
ownership by allowing credible assessments of economic and corporate
govemance in African countries by Africans. Moreover, it will contribute to
mutual accountability, demonstrating to African citizens and the international
community that African countries have the political will and commitment to
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conduct self-monitoring and corrective action where needed
(http://www.africaaction.org/doc02/eca2002b.htm). What remains to be seen
is the effectiveness of the APR process, with the continued social and political
problems in Zimbabwe still unresolved, the international community is using
that as a test for the African leaders. Ideally, the APR process is expected to
provide convergence of interests for African countries and their development
partners. By providing a means for assessing progress towards mutually
agreeable performance targets and standards for both donors and recipients, it
will move away from the old model of donor-imposed conditionalities.
From the country case study used in this study, it was obvious that the World
Bank imposed on Mozambique reform policies, which were designed without
adequate regard to local realities and domestic politics. Not surprisingly, the
policies have produced negative consequences - including the collapse of the
Cashew Nuts processing industry. The World Bank had hoped that resources
would be allocated more efficiently and that incomes of cashew farmers would
grow. However, the Mozambican authorities were partially culpable for blindly
accepting the policy advice without coming up with alternative proposals that
would save the cashew industry that constituted a big part of the country's
economy. The World/lMF approaches to the conditionality reform have often
failed to tackle the central problems. Streamlining and coordinating the Bank's
conditionalities through processes such as PRSPs would be more realistic
assumptions and projections rather than stipulating processes to be followed.
According to Warren Nyamugasira, cited by Charles Abugre (2000) in an
article entitled: 'Transformation at last, or new instruments of domination?
Analysis and Experience with the IMF and World Bank Poverty Reduction
Strategy (PRS) Initiative', ''There is need to allow different countries to pursue
different paths. Multilaterals (for example IMF and World Bank) are known for
being prescriptive. They may already have a paper outline what PRSPs
should look like, before one has even been written". The 'one-size-fits-all' IMF-
designed economic policies have been foisted on poor countries regardless of
each country's own circumstances. As a result, these governments often
exercise little control over their economies -- as was the case with the
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Mozambique Cashew industry. Not surprisingly, many SAPs have failed -
often largely because governments have felt little sense of ownership of their
reform programs.
It is crucial for the World Bank to embrace the African position that what is
required is adjustment with transformation. The view here is that the Bank
would need to concentrate on a pragmatic, non-ideological development
paradigm anchored on a human-centered strategy in which people's welfare is
seen as the main focus of the development process. Such an approach to
development will generate faster sustainable increases in the rate of economic
growth, reduce poverty, and build capacity in its widest context-
infrastructural, human, institutional, and technological (Whaites, 2002: 4).
Moving towards a new and effective partnership with Africa that benefits
Africans will require a major shift - both within and outside the continent.
Throughout its history, Africa has been exploited: during the slave trade by a
desire for labor, and in the colonial period by the scramble for land and wealth.
During the Cold War, Africa was used as an ideological battleground to further
geopolitical strategies and objectives. Africa's relationship with the Western
world has been far from a true partnership. While much has changed, much
also remains the same (Oxfam, 2002: 26). However, a true partnership is like
a successful 'romantic' relationship. Both partners have their own interests but
commit to work together towards not only satisfying each other's needs but
also sharing a mutual understanding and respect within a long-term
commitment.
However, in order for this genuine partnership to emerge, it will require
different kinds of engagement at global, regional, and national levels between
the international community and African leaders, underpinned by a new
commitment to accountability from both. At the global level, there is a need to
create the conditions for effective global governance that supports a new kind
of partnership with Africa. It is at this level that issues of global trade,
investment, business partnerships and financing, and international
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engagement must be addressed, based on the accountability of all sectors and
mutual rights and responsibilities (Oxfam, 2002: 27).
At the regional level, there is need to reinvigorate forms of political and
economic cooperation, especially with regard to peace building and
peacekeeping measures. It is perhaps at this level that the best chance lies
for finding new approaches to deal with those accused of committing war
crimes, crimes against humanity, profiteering from war economies, and
corruption (Oxfam, 2002:27).
At the national level, there is need to create the conditions that allow African
countries to function as legitimate states, with a social contract between their
governments and their people. This means that states are accountable to their
citizens, and capable of providing them with security and rule of law, conditions
for safe and secured livelihoods, as well as public services such as health and
education. This will require much greater engagement with social movements
and civil society on the part of the African leaders (Oxfam, 2002: 27).
At each of these levels, practical mechanisms and procedures are required to
enforce accountability. Prosperity and peace in Africa can only be achieved if
the local, national, regional, and international dimensions of the current crisis
are addressed. Nevertheless, the current partnership paradigm practiced by
most donors is akin to 'cruising bars for the best one-night stand', with little
understanding of the other's needs and no long-term commitment -- a point
that is exemplified by the country case study of this work.
Another aspect that merits emphasis is the interplay between the political and
economic factors. The socio-political realities are such that very few countries
are immune to political destabilization and social unrest. These realities and
the lesson that showcase in countries such as Liberia, Burundi, Democratic
Republic of Congo, Sudan, Cote d'lvoire, Zimbabwe and, most recently, the
military coup in Sao Tome and Principe, are some of the problems that
demand urgent attention if sustainable progress is to be achieved.
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Finally, from the experts' point of view, the NEPAD initiative appears to provide
the key elements of the evolving "New Aid Relationship" that are being
advocated by African leaders and their international development partners.
African leaders have recognized that they hold the key to the development of
the continent and they have formulated a comprehensive development
approach that focuses on the key areas for partnership anchored on mutual
interest, shared commitments, binding agreements and, most importantly, the
ownership of development processes. If the donors largely determine the
design and the terms upon which development assistance is provided to
African countries, the aid relationship can be characterized as essentially
hierarchical. If the views of the aid recipients remain unidentified,
unformulated or submerged, this would continue to have dire consequences
for the transformative and sustainable development of Africa. Indeed, there is
growing evidence that unless scope is provided to the recipient side actors to
assume important responsibilities, aid effectiveness is likely to remain low or
fluctuating, and the sustainability of donor aid efforts will remain doubtful.
National planning processes and courses of national development in African
countries should be seen as most effective where they are led under local
responsibility and control. In order to arrive at this ideal situation, gaps need to
be reduced and closed at the various intervention levels.
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Appendix 1: Foreign Direct Investment Inflows to Selected Countries in
Africa, 1995-2000
(Millions of U. S. dollars)
Country 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Botswana 70 70 100 96 37 30
Lesotho 275 286 269 262 136 233
Mauritius 19 37 55 12 49 277
Mozambique 45 73 64 213 382 139
Namibia 153 129 84 77 111 124
Swaziland 44 22 15 165 90 37
Uganda 121 121 175 210 222 254
Source: World Investment report 2001.
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